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ABSTRACT 
 
This study evaluates how null outcomes are analyzed and reported by accounting researchers based 
on an examination of two years of publications in The Accounting Review. As null outcomes reflect 
an inability to reject a null they, unlike rejections, do not lend themselves to specifically conclusive 
interpretations. Rather, substantive descriptive analyses are needed to draw useful inferences from 
such outcomes. In the 35 articles we identify as presenting substantive null outcomes, however, 
inappropriately conclusive interpretations of these outcomes are widespread while scant attention 
is given to providing the descriptive analyses needed to draw useful insights from them. Moreover, 
these deficiencies span articles published across all of the major accounting research areas (i.e., 
financial, managerial, audit, and tax) and encompass both archival and experimental designs. The 
analysis also proposes the use of descriptive techniques, particularly interval based analyses (e.g., 
Dyckman and Zeff, 2014; Dyckman, 2016)), as a desirable alternative for interpreting null 
outcomes.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  This article presents an analysis of how the academic accounting literature reports null 
outcomes. We define a null outcome as an instance where the statistical significance of two-tailed 
test of a null hypothesis results in p-values that are not small enough to be deemed statistically 
significant at conventional levels. From a classical hypothesis testing perspective such an outcome 
is taken as uninformative. It, in particular, does not indicate that the underlying null is true, only 
that there is an insufficient basis for reliably concluding that the examined evidence is inconsistent 
with it.1 Alternatively, from more descriptive perspectives, an inability to reject the null is broadly 
consistent with conjectures that any underlying effect is either absent or possibly small. However, 
the academic accounting literature, as will become very apparent in the analysis that follows, 
generally frames its analyses within the structure of classical hypothesis testing (see Dyckman and 
Zeff, 2014), and classical null hypothesis testing is a rather limited vehicle (i.e., it is very 
identification of what is not consistent with the evidence oriented) for conducting meaningful 
descriptive analyses. Consequently, the analyses accompanying null outcomes in this literature 
are, in the articles we examine at least, uniformly materially deficient and the interpretations 
provided to them are commonly misleading.   
   The analysis is based on a comprehensive examination of all articles published in The 
Accounting Review over the 2016-2017 time period. We identify 35 papers reporting null outcomes 
that were central to the paper’s analysis (evidenced by being connected to a formal hypothesis 
statement or being discussed in the article’s abstract or its introductory sections). The analysis 
evaluates these articles on three distinct dimensions: (1) relevant descriptive information (not) 
                                                          
1 See principles 1 and 2 of the ASA Statement on Statistical Significance and P-Values” (Wasserstein and Lazar, 
2016).  
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examined regarding the null outcome; (2) the degree to which the paper interprets the null outcome 
in a conclusive manner; (3) and, for a selected subset of outcomes, alternative confidence interval 
based interpretations of the reported evidence. Collectively, these examinations indicate that in the 
accounting literature null outcomes: (1) are rarely accompanied by examinations of relevant 
descriptive information (indeed, such information is often not discussed at all); (2) are without 
exception assigned inappropriately conclusive interpretations; and, (3) are much more 
substantively interpreted by using straightforward descriptive analysis based on confidence 
intervals.   
  Our analysis is related to recent work by Dyckman and Zeff (2014), Kim and Ji (2015), 
Ohlson (2015), Dyckman (2016), Kim, Ji, and Ahmed (2017), Harvey (2017), and Stone (2018). 
The focus of these studies, however, is on the reliability of null hypothesis rejections, including 
the relevance of accompanying supplemental procedures for judging the integrity of such 
rejections. They are particularly concerned with the deficiencies of hypothesis based testing 
analysis relative to more descriptive based methods and the importance of replication as a 
mechanism for instilling confidence that null hypothesis rejections are not spurious. Our analysis 
differs from this literature in that it focuses on the integrity of interpretations provided for null 
outcomes. Unlike rejections, null outcomes are non-events from a hypothesis testing perspective. 
Interpretation of null outcomes is a purely descriptive, not a test of hypothesis, challenge.   
  On one dimension, however, this study does have much in common with this integrity of 
rejection literature, particularly with arguments found in Dyckman and Zeff (2014, 2015) and 
Dyckman (2016). These studies observe that the general absence of statistical interval reporting is 
a significant shortfall in the existing accounting literature. As Dyckman and Zeff (2015) note, such 
intervals enable understanding from the perspective of “where we are led by the data to believe 
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the ﬁnding of interest is to be found.” (p. 520) A core contribution of our analysis is that it 
demonstrates that the literature does not seek understanding in this fashion, even when it is the 
only available approach to attaining much of any understanding at all.  
   The second core contribution of our analysis follows directly from the recent ASA 
Statement on Statistical Significance and P-Values (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016). This statement 
was promulgated by the American Statistical Association in response to a belief that “(the p-value) 
is commonly misused and misinterpreted.” Its stated purpose is to provide a “formal statement 
clarifying several widely agreed upon principles underlying the proper use and interpretation of 
the p-value.” The Statement’s introduction concludes by asserting that it “articulates in 
nontechnical terms a few select principles that could improve the conduct or interpretation of 
quantitative science, according to widespread consensus in the statistical community.”  
 Principle number 2 in the Statement speaks to the general question of inferring the truth of 
the null hypothesis based on p-value outcomes. It reads, in full, as follows: 
 P-values do not measure the probability that the studied hypothesis is true, or the 
 probability that the data were produced by random chance alone. Researchers often 
 wish to turn a p-value into a statement about the truth of a null hypothesis, or about 
 the probability that random chance produced the observed data. The p-value is neither. It 
 is a statement about data in relation to a specified hypothetical explanation, and is not a 
 statement about the explanation itself.  
Principle Number 6 provides further null outcome specific clarification on this point when it states 
that “a relatively large p-value does not imply evidence in favor of the null hypothesis; many other 
hypotheses may be equally or more consistent with the observed data.” 
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 Our analysis empirically documents that the accounting literature routinely employs high 
p-values and/or low value test statistics as a basis for advancing strong claims favoring the truth 
of underlying null hypotheses. That is, the literature’s approach to null outcome interpretation (i.e., 
non-small p-values) is starkly at odds with the relevant guidance from the ASA Statement.    
 
II. CLASSICAL HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND NULL OUTCOMES 
   Classical null hypothesis testing flows from the well-know if-then logical paradigm. A 
specific premise (null) is asserted to be true and that premise is evidenced by a necessary “then” 
outcome. In this paradigm the demonstrated absence of the necessary outcome negates the premise. 
Alternatively, and of direct relevance to null outcome interpretation, using the “then” outcome in 
and of itself as indicative of the truth of the premise is a well-known logical fallacy—affirming 
the consequent (e.g., see pp. 83-85, Damer, 2013). Simple observation of a necessary or expected 
outcome does not prove the antecedent that suggests it, since the same outcome may follow from 
many other premises. Hence, as a matter of simple logic, leaving aside any notion of how statistical 
inference draws upon such logic, using observed consequent consistent outcomes to infer anything 
about the plausibility of a null hypothesis, to say nothing of its truth, is problematic.  
   Statistical applications of this logical framework further complicate matters by introducing 
the notion of random error into the paradigm, meaning that the consequent is noisy, not truly 
observed. Hence, in the statistical setting noise is an explanation for any failure to observe a 
necessary outcome. Consequently, we are never in a position to falsify the premise with certainty. 
Instead, we rely on p-values to make rejection, or better, incompatibility with the evidence 
assertions. In the case of null outcomes, allowing for noisy measurement gives rise to irrefutable 
alternative hypotheses that are consistent with the evidence (some even more consistent with it), 
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yet fundamentally contradict the postulated null. And, the p-value says nothing useful at all about 
the seriousness of this alternative hypothesis issue. This thinking is clearly seen in Principle 6 of 
the ASA Statement when it cautions against using a high p-value as a basis for inferring that a tested 
null hypothesis is true since “many other hypotheses may be equally or more consistent with the 
data.”  And, it is for these logical and practical reasons that in many disciplines null outcomes are 
routinely ignored entirely or dismissed as entirely inconsequential with language such as “unable 
to reject.”    
   A closely related setting that also touches upon the affirmation of the consequent fallacy 
arises with respect to interpreting the alternative research hypothesis that typically accompanies a 
rejected null hypothesis. However, there are important distinctions between this sort of exercise 
and null affirmation interpretations. First, these interpretations begin from the perspective that the 
null hypothesis assertion is highly inconsistent with the examined evidence. Consequently, the 
analysis reasonably excludes a particularly relevant hypothesis (or, better, collection of 
hypotheses) from further consideration. In contrast, a null outcome in and of itself identifies no 
hypothesis that is inconsistent with the examined evidence. And, in fact, implicitly recognizes that 
the null and research hypothesis(es) are both consistent with the evidence.  
 Second, in the classical hypothesis testing structure the alternative research hypothesis is 
not, despite commonly encountered assertions to the contrary, directly tested.  It is not presumed 
true and held up for falsification. Rather, it is posed as a reason, typically with some possibility of 
being valid, why the null premise may not be true. Hence, the alternative research hypothesis is 
accepted, not proven, when the null is rejected. In some cases, it is the only (often as a matter of 
definition) plausible alternative explanation.2 In others, the accompanying analysis goes to great 
                                                          
2 For example, if the null is that the effect is less than or equal to zero and the alternative is simply that this null is 
not true then falsification (setting aside for the moment that the presence of random error negates the absolute proof 
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lengths to rule out or control other alternative explanations for the null hypothesis rejection.3 These 
analyses advance the case for the alternative in the form of an if and only if (i.e., “sufficient”) 
argument. That is, they aim to persuade the reader that the research hypothesis is uniquely 
consistent with the examined evidence. At this point it is, of course, up to the reader to judge the 
persuasive merits of the presented case, recognizing that the answer involves considerations that 
go well beyond whatever p-values are in play.4    
A Null Outcome Illustration 
 The preceding discussion is rather philosophical and hence abstract. It is sensible, 
therefore, to complement it with a more empirically grounded illustration as a means of 
demonstrating its more salient points. For this purpose we use a null outcome presented in a recent 
publication by Kim and Klein (2017). 5 This null outcome pertains to a test of whether there was 
an economy-wide change in the market value of firms in response to the passage of a rule change 
imposing mandates on audit committee composition and independence. The associated null 
hypothesis is motived by “market theory” which generally suggests that if the mandated changes 
are value-increasing then value-maximizing firms would have already changed voluntarily. Hence, 
the rule change should not be beneficial (increase market value) and may well be detrimental 
(decrease market value). In if/then terms then, the core assertion here is that if the rule change is 
                                                          
of anything) of the null proves the alternative. In contrast, if there is some sort of specific reasoning for why the 
effect is expected to be positive, falsification of the null does not prove the truth of this specific reasoning. Other 
reasons almost certainly exist for why the effect is not less than or equal to zero.  
3 Such refinements commonly are incorporated into the tested null hypothesis. (E.g., testing for no effect after 
controlling for a relevant correlated variable.) 
4 It is important to emphasize here that reaching a definitive inference based on judgement of the evidence is 
inherently inapplicable to interpreting null outcomes in statistical analysis settings. It will not work because it is 
impossible, by construction, to claim that contrarian alternatives to the advanced null hypothesis are even possibly 
unlikely in null outcome settings.     
5 Our choice of Kim and Klein here is, in part, motivated by the fact that it was selected for broader dissemination 
via an American Accounting Association press release captioned as” Longstanding mandate on corporate audit 
committees yields no benefit for investors, new research finds.” (AAA, 11/1/2017) That is, it seemingly is viewed as 
a particularly noteworthy accounting research contribution.  
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not, on average, beneficial then the observed market response to the rule passage will be zero (or 
negative). The associated alternative research hypothesis stems from “entrenchment theory,” 
which suggest that entrenched managers sacrifice market value to maintain and exploit their 
entrenched status. Forcing such entrenched manager firms to change their governance structure by 
means of the rule change may increase firm value, providing a rationale for questioning the market 
theory based if/then assertion.   
 The null outcome here is the absence of a statistically significant relation between firm 
market values in response to the rule change event. So, what does this outcome actually tell us? 
Well, if we follow the generally accepted test of hypothesis guidance for such interpretation, it 
tells us very little. We have no reliable basis for thinking that the examined evidence is inconsistent 
with the market theory no net positive benefit null. However, neither can we say that the examined 
evidence is inconsistent with the postulated alternative entrenchment theory hypotheses (i.e., 
positive values for the market valuation impact from the rule change.) Hence, based solely on the 
null outcome, we really can’t say much of anything at all in the way of reliable inference here.  
    In light of this “nothing much to be said” takeaway and our study’s focus on how the 
literature interprets such null outcomes, the actual interpretation provided for this null outcome by 
the article itself is also of considerable interest. The article’s introduction starts this exercise with 
the observation: “We find, on average, no statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns…” 
(p. 188). This statement is correct, but says nothing substantive. Searching for nothing and finding 
it is hardly a difficult or inherently meaningful accomplishment. The sentence following this 
statement, however, expands upon this non-finding, claiming that “Thus, the market assigned no 
overall net benefit or cost to compliance.”  This assertion is an affirmation of the consequent. It is 
fallacy. Moreover, at even a basic descriptive level, it is a highly misleading interpretation. Table 
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1 of the article reports the examined evidence underlying these interpretations. The estimated 
average per event date effect (across 8 events) is a +4.8 basis point increase in market value to the 
implementation of the rule. In other words, the entrenchment theory alternative (i.e., that there was 
an increase in value due to the net benefit of the rule) is not merely consistent with the examined 
evidence, it is actually better supported by the evidence than the no effect null that is being put 
forth as truth here.6  
 
III. THE DESCRIPTIVE PERSPECTIVE 
    Descriptive approaches to conducting statistical analysis are commonly advanced as an 
alternative or supplement to classical null hypothesis testing. The ASA Statement, for instance, 
discusses the relevance of other approaches, including “methods that emphasize estimation over 
testing,” It, in particular, identifies “confidence, credibility, (and) prediction intervals” as 
examples. The Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (2013) states “APA 
stresses that NHST (Null Hypothesis Statistical Significance Testing) is but a starting point and 
that additional reporting elements such as effect sizes, confidence intervals, and extensive 
description are needed to convey the most complete meaning of the results.” (p. 33) In the specific 
case of null outcomes, Aberson (2002) indicates that “presenting results that ‘support’ a null 
hypothesis requires more detailed statistical reporting than do results that reject the null 
hypothesis.” 
                                                          
6 If, in particular, the null hypothesis is reformulated to be that the estimated effect of the rule is greater than zero (an 
unconventional but allowed phrasing for a null), then it would not be rejected either. Based on the article’ 
affirmative approach to interpreting null outcomes the table 1 evidence should be taken as indicating that the market 
did indeed assign a net benefit to the rule change. An inference, that is likely consistent with the priors of the rule-
makers who determined that the rule was needed. The more general lesson here, however, is that null affirmation 
interpretation paves the way for different researchers (or even a single researcher) to draw contradictory inferences 
from the same body of evidence simply as a matter of how the null is phrased.    
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  In this analysis we advance confidence intervals as a particularly insightful approach for 
obtaining meaningful insights in null outcome settings. While confidence intervals are estimated 
from many of the same underlying constructs employed in null hypothesis testing (e.g., standard 
errors, alpha levels, estimated effect values), they do not center the analysis around specific 
hypotheses (i.e., the null hypothesis, in particular).  Instead, a confidence interval identifies a range 
of effect values (or hypothesized effect values) that are plausibly consistent with the evidence, 
given some pre-set tolerance level for the acceptable level of uncertainty in this determination.  
  We have three reasons for focusing on confidence intervals.  First, they are widely accepted 
and understood. Their determination is typically covered in introductory level statistics courses. 
The Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (2009), in fact, states 
“complete reporting of all tested hypotheses and estimates of appropriate effect sizes and 
confidence intervals are the minimum expectation for APA journals.”  (p. 33) Aberson (2002) 
argues that “reporting confidence intervals allows for stronger conclusions about the viability of 
null hypotheses than does reporting of null hypothesis test statistics, probabilities, and effect 
sizes.” Second, confidence interval outcomes are readily mapped to null hypothesis testing 
outcomes. Specifically, for a given critical p-value a null hypothesis rejection corresponds to a 
setting where the hypothesized null value (or range of values) falls outside the confidence interval 
based on that same p-value. Alternatively, a null outcome corresponds to a setting where the 
hypothesized null value falls within this confidence interval. Third, relevant confidence intervals 
can generally be determined from values reported in the performance of null hypothesis testing. 
Hence, we can readily benchmark how studies interpret null outcomes relative to the broader 
descriptive understandings of such outcomes provided by the associated confidence intervals.   
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   In appreciating the relevance of confidence interval analysis for null outcome settings it is 
particularly important to recognize that any associated null hypothesis testing analysis has, at this 
point, come up empty handed. The null hypothesis, which is the object of the test, is not 
inconsistent with the evidence. But, neither is the alternative research hypothesis, which is the 
rationale for questioning the null to begin with, inconsistent with the evidence. In fact, within the 
rigid framework that such testing operates, it follows that a null outcome has no inconsistent-with-
the-evidence implications whatsoever for any considered hypothesis. Hence, given a null outcome, 
the immediate interpretative inference obtained from the confidence interval is an identification of 
a set of hypotheses or beliefs that are highly inconsistent with the evidence. And, if the confidence 
interval does no more than this then it is doing far more in terms of inference than is achieved by 
merely reporting a statistically insignificant outcome.  
 The confidence interval can also serve as a foundation for drawing more substantive 
descriptive inferences about effect magnitudes, as well as the general suitability of the analysis for 
drawing meaningful inferences. In particular, if a confidence interval is contextually narrow (i.e., 
standard errors are low and test power is high) then it may be feasible to advance an argument that 
the set of evidence consistent values in the confidence interval contains no consequential or 
substantively meaningful alternative (to the null) hypothesis values. For example, in the case of a 
no effect null, the confidence interval may indicate that the upper and lower bounds are both 
inconsequentially small.  Importantly, a clearly necessary component of such a determination is a 
discussion and analysis pointing out why these bounds, in the context of the studied issue, are 
plausibly characterized as being “small” or inconsequentially different from the null value. 
Alternatively, the confidence interval may turn out to be very wide. This width indicates that the 
study is effectively devoid of power. Absent power, there is little reason to view the associated 
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analysis as a serious attempt at testing any null hypothesis, or describing the relevant empirical 
landscape.  
   Finally, there are those outcomes where the associated confidence interval is not 
particularly wide, but neither is it narrow enough to reasonably argue that the set of evidence-
consistent values are effectively indistinguishable from the null hypothesis value. Here, at a 
descriptive level a study can reasonably characterize a large number of alternative hypotheses, 
including many of the larger values that are consistent with the alternative research hypothesis, as 
being highly inconsistent with the examined evidence. Hence, the reporting study is providing 
some relevant insights about the empirical landscape of interest. Such identification may also point 
the way for more targeted and powerful approaches that narrow the set of evidence-consistent 
alternative hypotheses even further.  It also indicates a need to look to aggregate evidence across 
studies using meta-analysis techniques. However, in engaging in such efforts, it is important to 
recognize that as the confidence interval narrows the ultimate outcome may well shift from null 
outcome to null hypothesis rejection (as power increases the likelihood of correctly rejecting false 
nulls). 
 Given this confidence interval perspective on interpreting null outcomes, we now revisit 
the Kim and Klein null outcome regarding the general market-wide response to the rule change 
they examine. The estimated average value they report is 0.048% per event date. As there are eight 
event dates the cumulative return over all eight dates is at least 0.384%. (8*.048), or 38.4 basis 
points.7 The standard error for the per event date average is around 0.066, or 6.6 basis points. We 
                                                          
7 Each event date consists of two days. And, per equation (1) of the article, they estimate return effects per day. It is 
unclear whether or not Table 1 doubles these coefficient estimates to produce true two day cumulative returns, or is 
simply reporting event-specific equation (1) coefficient estimates (i.e., averages of the two day event date returns). 
For purposes of this discussion we assume that the table is reporting two-day cumulative returns. We also, take the 
text assertion that the average return effect is +0.48% rather than +0.048% to be a typographical error.   
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determine this value by dividing the effect magnitude by the associated reported t-value (.048/.73).  
As the interest here is in the sum over the 8 events, the estimated standard error for the sum is 
.524% (8*.066), or 52.8 basis points. Hence, a two-standard deviation (which typically 
corresponds to a p value of slightly less than 5%), confidence interval for the overall effect has a 
lower bound of -67.2 basis points and an upper bound of 144 basis points.8 Hence, alternative 
hypotheses that the net effect of the rule change was to increase firm values across the board by 
100 or more basis points are not inconsistent with the examined evidence here. As, it is quite 
difficult to conceive of how 100+ basis points is somehow small or inconsequential, particularly 
when extended across the market as a whole, the viable descriptive inference here is that it is 
unlikely that the net impact of the rule change was extraordinarily positive. 9  Moreover, the 
examined evidence is most certainly not a descriptively sound basis for claiming that the market 
assigned no, or even little, benefit to the rule change.  
IV. EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
  The preceding discussion raises two specific empirically addressable issues with respect to 
null outcome analysis reporting in the accounting literature. First, any sort of substantive 
interpretation of such an outcome requires empirical analysis and support that goes well beyond 
                                                          
8 We employ two standard deviation confidence intervals to conform with the traditional emphasis on the .05 p-
value dividing line between null and rejection outcomes. Apart from null hypothesis testing dogma, however, there 
is no compelling reason to employ such wide intervals. For instance, the well-known cone of uncertainty prediction 
intervals (a form of confidence interval) used in hurricane forecasting employ approximately one standard deviation 
confidence intervals for forecasts of “center path of the storm” tracks. Hence, this confidence interval exercise is 
rather tolerant of failing to include possible but comparatively unlikely paths in the prediction intervals they report. .  
9In a follow-on analysis, Kim and Klein focus on the differential event period cumulative return effects between 
affected and unaffected firms. In their model (1), reported in table 4, the two standard deviation confidence interval 
for this difference has a lower bound of -14.6 basis points and an upper bound of 5.8 basis points. Hence, there is a 
strong descriptive case for asserting that the differential effect across these two groups is likely quite small. 
However, this evidence is relevant to the overall effect only under the further assumption that unaffected firms were 
in no way benefited by the rule. There may well be broader social welfare gains from the rule, obtained from 
leveling up the reporting and control playing field for instance or by making it impossible for in-compliance firms to 
revert to an out-of-compliance state. If so, then in-compliance firms would also benefit from the rule change. 
Consequently, this analysis is addressing a distinctly different question--the differential benefit from the rule change, 
not the overall unconditional benefit of the rule change. 
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the p-values and associated test statistics that led to the null outcome determination. Hence, we are 
interested in empirically documenting what sorts of analyses are, or are not, being provided in 
terms of providing relevant supporting evidence relevant to interpreting null outcomes. In 
particular, are null outcome interpretations based on nothing more than a high p-value or low test 
statistic value? Or, do they draw upon further empirical evidence such as that available from 
estimated effect magnitudes, estimate standard errors, or confidence intervals?  
  Second, we are interested in empirically documenting what sorts of interpretations the 
literature is providing for null outcomes. Nickerson (2000) identifies a number of false beliefs 
encountered in the context of classical hypothesis testing. One of these is the “Belief that failing 
to reject the null hypothesis is equivalent to demonstrating that it is true.” (p. 260) Hence, 
particularly in light of the previously discussed problematic Kim and Klein null outcome 
interpretation, we are interested in whether null outcomes are interpreted in ways that are 
consistent with a the examined evidence. Or, are they commonly provided with overly conclusive 
interpretations?  Interpretations that are unsupported by any of the reporting study’s underlying 
examinations and analyses of the empirical evidence.  
 
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF NULL OUTCOME REPORTING 
Identification of Published Null Outcomes 
   Our empirical analysis is based on a set of null outcomes reported in the literature that we 
identified by means of a comprehensive examination of articles published in The Accounting 
Review in 2016 and 2017. We conduct our empirical analyses of how null outcomes are analyzed 
and interpreted at a fairly in-depth level. Indeed, the empirical analyses we present are arguably 
more qualitative than quantitative in nature. The fundamental observational unit here is, in fact, a 
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complete research article. Large sample approaches are not particularly feasible and most certainly 
not cost-effective for analyzing full article (text) data points. Moreover, an overly large sample 
size would likely actually degrade the inferential validity of the analysis. Currently, very specific 
analysis of every single identified article is provided somewhere in our paper (inclusive of 
provided appendices). One can do this effectively for a limited number of articles, but not for large 
numbers.  The analysis makes extensive use of specific examples discovered in the sample. The 
generalizability of this illustration by example approach actually decreases as the sample size 
increases since it is far easier to identify an intriguing collection of oddities in a sample of say 
1,000 than in a sample of only 35. Finally, the small sample size together with the article level 
nature of the analyses allow any reader to readily evaluate or critique the underlying bases for our 
inferences on an article by article basis.  
 Based on the thinking that the analysis be based on relatively manageable number of null 
outcomes we next considered how to identify such a set in a fashion that, in particular, would 
mitigate criticism that we had “cherry-picked” articles for study. That is, given the nature of the 
analysis it seemed particularly desirable that we strive to make the article selection task both 
replicable (and analyzable) and free from (arbitrary) researcher choices as possible. Hence, we 
opted to examine articles from a single journal using a time period with natural start and end points. 
We also felt that the sample so-selected be representative of high quality accounting research, as 
broadly defined as possible. Given these objectives, The Accounting Review strikes us as the 
clearly obvious journal choice. It is the flagship journal of the world’s largest association of 
accounting academics. It also has an extraordinarily diverse editorial board and employs a 
comparatively decentralized editorial decision-making structure. So, while we recognize that the 
direct generalizability of our analysis pertains to the population of articles appearing in recent 
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issues of The Accounting Review, we also take the state of this population as the most reasonable 
single journal-based proxy for the general state of the accounting literature.   
 We identify articles reporting null outcomes based on three separate examinations of every 
article published in The Accounting Review over the 2016-17 time period (128 articles in total, 113 
of which employ null hypothesis testing methods). Based on these examinations all reported null 
outcomes, regardless of importance, were identified in each paper. We then separated these 
outcomes into those that were deemed to play a central role in the paper and those that were not 
deemed to play such a role. Null outcomes that directly pertained to paper identified hypotheses 
and research questions as well as outcomes mentioned in a paper’s abstract and introductory (pre-
empirical analyses) sections are taken to have central roles while outcomes pertaining to robustness 
tests, validity checks, or control variables were not unless specifically identified in article abstracts 
or emphasized in article introductory sections. We located a total of 63 such central null outcomes 
from 35 separate articles based on this process. Appendix B provides a complete listing of the 
underlying research questions and hypotheses associated with these outcomes.  
   Table 1 lists the set of null outcome articles we identified along with some initial article 
level descriptive information. The set of articles span the major empirical research areas in 
accounting (auditing, financial, managerial, and tax) and encompass both archival and 
experimental studies. 14 of the studies address auditing, possibly indicating a predisposition for 
null outcomes in this domain. However, a contributing explanation is that auditing articles were 
particularly prevalent in The Accounting Review during the time period we study. Most of the 
articles (20) contain only a single null outcome. However, in one instance an article contains 7 null 
outcomes while another contains 5. 43 of the 63 outcomes are referenced in the article abstracts, 
and the abstracts of all but 6 of the articles contain some sort of explicit null outcome-based 
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inference. As the abstract is highly prominent and word count restricted, these choices to abstract 
reference null outcomes indicate that the authors view them as speaking to important aspects of 
their articles. It is also inconsistent with the classical hypothesis testing perspective that null 
outcomes lack inferential merit. Finally, an explicit statement of the associated null hypothesis or 
prediction accompanies only 21 of the 63 null outcomes.  
Evidence on Descriptive Analysis Provided for Null Outcomes 
   For our purpose, relevant descriptive analysis for a null outcome involves most any effort 
by an article that goes beyond a tabulated presentation of the estimated effect magnitude 
accompanied by a test of null hypothesis produced high p-value or low test statistic value. Such 
analysis may be nothing more than stating the estimated effect magnitude in the text discussion of 
the null outcome or a textual assertion that the estimated effect magnitude is small. Additionally, 
it may engage with the question of the precision associated with the estimated effect by either 
formally tabulating the associated standard error or, better, presenting and discussing the standard 
error magnitude in the body of the article. Finally, it may go so far as to present and analyze 
confidence intervals for null outcome linked estimated effects. 
 Table 2 presents the sorts of descriptive statistics that accompany each of the identified 
null outcomes we examine by article. Arguably, the most pertinent comprehensive descriptive 
statistic for a null outcome is a low p-value based confidence interval (CI). However, this key 
statistic is never reported.10 Indeed, we were unable to locate a substantive discussion of the range 
of possible underlying null outcome consistent values in any of the 35 articles. Another item of 
descriptive relevance is the estimated standard error of the estimated null effect. If this standard 
error is “large” then the set of possible underlying effect values that is consistent with the observed 
                                                          
10 Interestingly, Humphreys, Gary, and Trotman (2016) does report confidence intervals for several of its null 
rejection outcomes (p. 1457), but not for either of its two null outcomes.  
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outcome is also large, while if the standard error is “small” then this set of values is also small or, 
more to the point, precise. The standard error is, in particular, a readily obtainable measure of the 
underlying power of the statistical test. Hence, we might reasonably expect articles reporting null 
outcomes to be particularly keen about it. They are not. Only 5 of the 35 articles report standard 
errors of estimated null outcome effects. And, in these cases the standard error is simply tabulated. 
None of the articles mentions the standard error of the estimate in its text discussion.   
 The final three columns of table 2 focus on the text discussions of null outcomes with a 
focus on the degree to which articles pay attention to the most basic descriptive statistic, the 
estimated magnitude of the effect. Here again the level of omission is striking. Only 12 of the 
articles incorporate specific values of the estimated effects in their text discussion. And, the 
majority of these discussions are superficial (i.e., the effect is simply reported with no substantive 
accompanying interpretation as to why it should be taken as “small”). Another 5 articles describe 
the tabulated effect size without mentioning its specific magnitude. These claims uniformly take 
the form of unsupported assertions that the estimated effect is small. In contrast, 4 articles both 
present the estimated effect magnitude in the text and provide additional discussion of it. These 
discussions all involve somehow comparing the estimated effect magnitude to a relevant 
benchmark value (i.e, that the estimated effect is much smaller than the benchmark value).   
 Thirteen of the articles also specifically mention numeric p-value or test statistic values 
(e.g., t-values) for null outcomes in their text discussions of these outcomes. As stated in Principle 
1 of the ASA Statement such values do reflect the degree of consistency between the null outcome 
and the underlying evidence. However, it is not clear how much they add on this dimension relative 
to the underlying estimated effect values.  
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 The general absence of descriptive textual engagement with estimated effect magnitudes 
associated with null outcomes documented here is also notable in light of the sorts of descriptive 
analyses commonly provided for effect magnitudes for null rejections. When a null is rejected and 
the associated alternative is accepted then a common next step is a descriptive demonstration that 
the effect size of the alternative is “economically significant” or, more generally, large enough to 
care about.11 For example, in the set of analyses we examine DeFond, Lim, and Zhang (2016) 
argue that the negative relation between client conservatism they document is “economically 
important” because, based on one measure, moving from the bottom to top conservatism decile 
reduces audit fees by 29%. 12   In an untabulated analysis, we found that such “it is large” 
substantive descriptive assessments are found in well over half of the articles reporting null 
hypothesis rejections published in The Accounting Review over the 2016-17 period. We found little 
evidence of any sorts of parallel “it is small” descriptive assessments for null outcomes in the 
articles examined here.13     
Evidence on Null Outcome Interpretation 
   We examine how the question of how articles interpret null outcomes by reviewing and 
identifying associated interpretative statements provided by each null outcome reporting article’s 
text discussion. We then classify each of these statements into one of the following five categories:  
                                                          
11 Stone (2018), in fact, based on the premise that almost all (point) null hypotheses encountered in the accounting 
literature are truly false, argues that effect size is the actual relevant question in most null hypothesis rejection 
settings. 
12 Interestingly, DeFond et al. (2016) also report a parallel analysis of the relation between unconditional 
conservatism and audit fees that leads them to conclude that “auditors do not strategically respond to unconditional 
conservatism by adjusting their fees” (emphasis theirs). They, however, provide no discussion as to why the 
magnitudes they document should be considered small. That is, in a setting where the relevant literature Aberson, 
2002) argues that substantially more descriptive analysis is needed, we do the opposite, providing far less (arguably 
“zero”) descriptive analysis for null outcomes than for null rejections.    
13 In the set of articles we examine, we encountered some form of coefficient “smallness” discussion of effect 
magnitudes in only four of them: Drake et al. (2016), Lennox (2016), Henry and Leone (2016), and Robinson et al. 
(2016). 
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Precisely Conclusive (PC); Generally Conclusive (GC); Selectively Conclusive (SC); Arguably 
Conclusive (AC); and Non-Conclusive (NC). 
   PC statements are those that are highly conclusive of the null being exactly true. 
Commonly, as is seen in the previous discussion of the Kim and Klein analysis, such statements 
present the no effect outcome as indicating that there is truly no effect at all.14 For instance, Lennox 
(2016) states that he finds “no change in audit quality.” Similarly, Choi et al. (2016) claim that 
“performance does not differ between … tournaments.” (emphasis in both quoted statements ours). 
However, another form that such statements take is as denials of the validity of the alternative 
hypothesis. Such assertions range from assertions by Wieczynska (2016) that a null outcome 
constitutes a rejection of the alternative hypothesis (p. 1269) to somewhat milder assertions that 
an outcome is “inconsistent with” the alternative (e.g., Guenther et al., 2017; Kim and Klein, 2017; 
Lourenco, 2016).15  
  As is clear from even a very narrow reading, PC interpretations of null outcomes violate 
Principles 2 and 6 of the ASA Statement. High p-values are not an acceptable evidential basis for 
concluding or even inferring that a null hypothesis is true, or inferring that an alternative hypothesis 
is not true. Moreover, this basic structure to the inferential dimensions of null hypothesis testing 
is not at all new. It is, as discussed earlier, foundational to the logical structure underlying null 
hypothesis testing. 
                                                          
14 In a few instances the precisely conclusive phrasing is accompanied by less conclusive qualifications such as 
“indicates”, “implies.” In general, we ignored such qualifications in our classifications since, as a matter of 
semantics, they do not negate the precisely conclusive language that follows. And, there were not a sufficient 
number of these qualifications to merit a separate category (e.g., precisely conclusive with qualifications).  
15 An attribution of “inconsistency” has the appearance of lacking a high degree of conclusiveness. However, the 
problem here is that a null outcome is not, absent additional descriptive insights, at a very fundamental level 
possibly inconsistent with anything. That is, one is not be able to reliably reject a hypothesis that the effect is 
positive, that it is negative, or that it is zero.  
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   We identify a null outcome interpretation as Generally Conclusive when it advances the 
notion that the tested null hypothesis is approximately true. Claims that the effect is “small”, 
“similar”, or “comparable” fall into this category. We also include claims of insignificance in this 
category when the discussion provides no accompanying context indicating that it is specifically 
discussing statistical significance. A key distinction between statements that are classified as GC 
relative to those that are classified as PC is that effective descriptive analyses (something the table 
2 evidence indicates is almost entirely absent in the set of articles we examine) could provide a 
basis for justifying GC interpretations. That is, a descriptive analysis, particularly one in the form 
of confidence interval presentation and discussion, could very well plausibly establish the 
interpretation that an effect is not large or dissimilar.  
   Another common approach to interpreting null outcomes is to state that they are consistent 
with or supportive of the null hypothesis or that they are not supportive of the associated alternative 
hypothesis. We label these sorts of statements as Selectively Conclusive because from a 
descriptive perspective they are, essentially, cherry picking the set of available individually 
arguably acceptable (but incomplete) descriptions for the null outcome. This acceptability 
perspective is arguably in line with the language found in Principle 1 of the ASA Statement where 
it observes that a p-value summarizes “the incompatibility between a particular set of data and a 
proposed model of the data…..The smaller the  p-value, the greater the statistical incompatibility 
of the data with the null hypothesis.”16  However, as noted previously, Principle 6 of the ASA 
Statement also clearly indicates that a null outcome does not in any way rule out the consistency 
of other hypotheses, particularly the alternative research hypothesis, with the evidence. That is, in 
                                                          
16 In fact, textbook presentations of hypothesis testing sometimes use the “consistent with the null” approach in 
describing null outcomes. Contextually, however, such presentations are also quite clear to avoid making anything 
conclusive out of this description.  
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general, a null outcome is consistent with any relevant hypothesis and, in particular, is most 
certainly not inconsistent with either the tested null hypothesis or any associated alternative 
research hypothesis. Collectively, from a descriptive perspective this ASA guidance argues against 
SC interpretations for the central findings of an analysis apart from a recognition that reasonable 
contrarian hypotheses are also consistent with the observed evidence.17   
  We divide those null outcome descriptions that do not fall into the first three conclusiveness 
categories between those we deem to be arguably conclusive and those that we deem to be non-
conclusive. Most of those identified as arguably conclusive are so identified because of how they 
present the null outcome’s absence of statistical significance. The notion of statistical significance 
and, in particular, the lack thereof, pose a particularly difficult challenge when presenting a null 
outcome. A representationally faithful discussion of a null outcome certainly needs to report the 
fact that it lacks statistical significance. Yet, at the same time, it should avoid conveying any sense 
of conclusiveness to this outcome because such an outcome does not say an effect is absent nor, 
absent additional descriptive analyses, does it even say much of anything about what magnitudes 
of effects are likely or unlikely. Given this perspective, stating that an effect is “statistically 
insignificant,” while accurate, is also arguably advancing the case the effect is either non-existent 
or insubstantial, which are inferences that do not necessarily follow from a lack of statistical 
significance.18 In contrast, descriptions such as “unable to reject, “not reliably different,” and “no 
                                                          
17 As a matter of convention, null hypotheses are commonly phrased as inclusive of zero or no difference. However, 
the underlying hypothesis testing framework does not require this. It is perfectly valid to propose and test a 
hypothesis that an effect is strictly less than zero, strictly greater than zero, or that it exceeds or falls below some 
non-zero threshold value, in much the same manner that one proposes and tests a null that an effect equals or is 
inclusive of zero. One wonders, however, how palatable describing a failure to reject a null hypothesis that there has 
been a 20% reduction in the likelihood of reporting a restatement (which would be true in both the Lennox (2016) 
and Kim and Klein (2017) analyses) in an SC fashion (e.g., “there is no evidence that the effect is less than 20%,” 
or,  “the evidence is consistent with a 20% reduction”) would be to the vast majority of readers, reviewers, and 
editors?     
18 Lindsay (1994) addresses the presence of this “tendency to equate scientific significance with statistical 
significance” bias in the accounting literature. And, in fact, a very obvious example of this sort of fundamental 
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reliable evidence of” are more neutral. We classify these sorts of interpretations as being non-
conclusive.  
 Tables 3 and 4 present summary analyses based on this five-level categorization system 
for the descriptive language employed in presenting null outcomes. Table 3 focuses on how article 
abstracts interpret null outcomes while table 4 focuses on how article text, apart from the abstract, 
interpret null outcomes. Detailed information on textual null outcome descriptions is available 
upon request from the corresponding author.   
   29 of the 35 articles in our study discuss some aspect of a null outcome in their abstracts. 
There are a total of 43 underlying null outcomes that are addressed in these abstracts.  Table 3 lists 
the exact abstract phrasing employed in discussing each of these outcomes. Based on our five-way 
categorization system we deemed 27 of the 43 as described in a precisely conclusive fashion. 
Another 8 are deemed generally conclusive while the remaining 8 are selectively conclusive. In 
summary, the evidence here is overwhelming, in article abstracts the literature as a matter of course 
presents inherently inconclusive empirical evidence in misleadingly conclusive terms. Moreover, 
the substantial majority of the time the language employed is highly conclusive.  
   Table 4 presents summary data for a similar analysis of statements pertaining to null 
outcomes found in the texts of the 35 articles. Summary counts of PC, GC, SC, AC, and NC 
statements are provided by article. As was true for abstracts, precisely conclusive terms 
predominate. All but two of the articles employ such language at some point to describe reported 
null outcomes. However, the two exceptions, Henry and Leone (2016) and Lennox (2016), each 
employ precisely conclusive language in their abstracts (see table 3). Hence, none of the articles 
                                                          
misinterpretation of the concept of statistical insignificance is seen in the set of null outcomes in one of the articles 
we examine in this study. Specifically, Lin and Wang (2016) justify their assertion that “innovation premium is not 
related to takeover probability” explicitly because “the coefficient on TakoverProbalility X Innovaton Efficiency is 
statistically insignificant.”  (p. 965) 
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steers entirely clear of falsely asserting at some point that an observed null outcome indicates that 
the tested null hypothesis is precisely true. Equally alarming, only two articles, Cannon and Bedard 
(2017) and Henry and Leone (2016), manage to provide a clearly inconclusive description of a 
null outcome. And, each of these articles achieves this rarified level of candor precisely once: 
Cannon and Bedard, when it observes for its hypotheses H5b and H6b that “model results do not 
reject the null for both constructs” (p. 99); and Henry and Leone when it observes that “tests of 
differences cannot reject the null hypothesis that the explanatory power of models incorporating 
the alternatives is equivalent.” (p. 155) 
 
VI. CONFIDENCE INTERVAL ANALYSES 
  The most glaring descriptive deficiency in the null outcome interpretations we document 
is the absence of confidence interval reporting. In this section we illustrate the relevance and 
efficacy of confidence interval based descriptive analysis by providing such analyses for five of 
the null outcomes we identified in our prior analyses. Our goal in doing this is twofold. First, as a 
follow-on to Dyckman and Zeff (2014) we illustrate that conducting such analyses is both feasible 
and substantive. Second, we use these analyses to underscore the point of just how much an 
accompanying confidence interval alters a null outcome’s interpretation, at least relative to how 
the original article interprets it. Given these objectives, we further admit to the fact that the null 
outcomes we address here were chosen to some degree for simplicity, variety and effect. However, 
Appendix C provides similar analyses for many more of the null outcomes identified in our 
analysis. We could likely have used any five of them to reach the same substantive insights that 
emerge from those chosen for presentation and discussion here.    
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 Lennox (2016)  
   Lennox (2016) tests the null hypothesis that “There is no change in audit quality after 
companies reduce their APTS purchases following the new rules” using three measures of audit 
quality. Null outcomes are obtained for all three measures, and in this evaluation we treat each of 
these measures as a separate outcome. In his paper’s text discussion Lennox asserts that the 
estimated coefficients for the change effects are “very small” and that the evidence “suggests no 
significant change in misstatements, tax-related misstatements, or going-concern opinions.” The 
main results are presented for the independent variable TREATxPOST in his table 6 for (1) a full 
sample; and, (2) a matched sample. In this re-examination we focus on the more powerful (per 
Lennox) full sample outcomes. 
  We generate two standard deviation confidence intervals for each of the full sample 
TREATxPOST estimates by first dividing the reported effect by its associated t-value as standard 
error estimates are not directly reported. This yields standard error estimates of .118, 1, and .175 
for misstatements tax-related misstatements, and going concern opinions. As the respective 
estimated effects are -0.04, -0.01, and .29 the following two standard deviation confidence 
intervals are obtained: 
            (1) Misstatements:  lower bound (LB) -0.276;   upper bound (UB): +0.196 
            (2) Tax Misstatements:                 LB = -2.01;                         UB =  +1.99 
            (3) Going Concern Opinion:        LB  = -0.06;                         UB = + 0.64   . 
As the tax misstatements standard error derivation is problematic due to the non-reporting of 
coefficient estimate significant digits we limit our descriptive analyses to the confidence intervals 
for misstatements and going concerns opinions.  
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 As logistic regressions are employed the coefficient and bound magnitudes are not directly 
interpretable. However, they can be converted into odds ratios which are substantively 
interpretable. In the case of misstatements converting the above UB and LB values into odds ratios 
indicates that in the post restriction period hypothesized effect values as high as an increase of 
21.65% or as small as a decline of 24.12% are not inconsistent with the examined evidence. Hence, 
based on this additional analysis we can certainly infer that the rule did not lead to quite large 
declines, it is quite difficult to see how they would justify an inference that the evidence indicates 
that the decline in misstatements was, at most, small. And, these bounds are certainly inconsistent 
with a claim such as that found in the article’s abstract that the evidence shows that no decline at 
all occurred in response to the implementation of APTS restrictions.   
  In the case of going concern opinions converting the above LB and UB values into 
likelihoods yields a rather small value of a 6% decline for the LB. The UB value, however, is 
+89.65%. That is, based on the underlying evidence examined in this study it is not possibly to 
reliably rule out hypotheses that the likelihood that an affected firm reported a going concern 
opinion (where higher going concern opinion rates signal an improvement in audit quality) nearly 
doubled after the implementation of the restrictions.19 In this case it is difficult to see why an 
analysis would be comfortable saying anything at all about the plausibility of the null hypotheses 
being true or the range of likely effect values consistent with the data being small. 
                                                          
19 As going concern opinions are rare events the range of extreme likelihoods here is arguably misleading. That is, if 
there is only a .5% chance of a going concern opinion to begin with then a doubling of this value only increases it to 
1%, which does not seem all that big in the overall scheme of things. However, this line of thinking raises the more 
substantive question of why a study would choose to employ such an inherently low impact measure? That is, would 
we really expect the sort of change in rules being evaluated here to cause some sort of meteoritic rise in going 
concern opinions? Offhand, we think most would be surprised if this sort of rule changed moved the needle by as 
much as 25%. Consequently, this low economic magnitude effect perspective on the outcome is better viewed as a 
criticism of the study’s choice to use such a low impact measure to begin with, not as grounds for debating what sort 
of outcome should be viewed as “not small.” Hence, given that a measure is been deemed suitable for inferential 
analysis, it is difficult to conceive why a sizable percentage change in it can possibly be viewed as inconsequential.      
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  Finally, and uniquely among the null outcome papers we examine, Lennox provides 
analyses targeting the concern that his tests may lack the power to support his no effect conclusion.  
His approach is particularly relevant to our analysis in that it relies on hypothesis tests of non-zero 
null effects. Specifically, he evaluates whether a hypothetical effect of a given magnitude would 
have been rejected. Essentially, this approach is a very limited form of power curve analysis. That 
is, an attempt to measure the type 2 error rate. The key component to such an analysis, of course, 
is the determination of the hypothetical (assuming the null is false) effect’s magnitude. Larger 
effects are easier to detect than smaller ones so the type 2 error rate is necessarily dependent on 
the size of the effect that is being searched for. A power curve reports rejection likelihoods for a 
given p-level as the size of the unobserved effect varies.  
  Lennox, however, does not report power curves. Rather, the study focuses on a specific 
effect magnitude--the estimated pre-existing difference in effect between the affected and 
unaffected sample firms. In the case of misstatements this effect is -0.27, and we are informed that 
an underlying offsetting effect of this magnitude would be rejected at the .05 level. This is roughly 
in line with what our confidence interval analysis lower bound of -0.276 (i.e., a  24% reduction in 
likelihood) implies when one takes into consideration the fact that it is based on rounded numbers 
(the reported estimate and t-value) and a slightly higher significance level threshold.20 That is, if 
the average decline in restatement likelihood had exceeded 24%, which is around what the 
underlying difference in affected and unaffected firms is prior to the rule change, then we would 
almost certainly have rejected the no change null. What is far less clear, however, is why we should 
                                                          
20 Moreover, the -0.276 confidence interval determination is much more straightforward, and is not interpretatively 
tied to a specific, likely selectively chosen, counterfactual. That is, one clear takeaway from the Lennox analysis is 
that relative to confidence interval analysis, hypothesis testing is a comparatively awkward approach to conducting 
meaningful descriptive analyses of hull outcomes.  
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take reliably ruling out the presence of a 24% or more reduction in restatement likelihood as 
somehow advancing a conclusion that the underlying change is small, to say nothing about a claim 
that there is “no change in audit quality,” in any sort of compelling fashion.    
Kim and Klein (2017) 
     In addition to reporting on the net equity valuation impact of listing standard changes, 
which we examine in the initial portion of this paper, Kim and Klein (2017) also report an analysis 
addressing the impact of these changes on restatement and fraud likelihoods as well as earnings 
management levels. Based on this analysis they conclude that there is no evidence of a change in 
restatements, fraud related restatements, or earnings management in response to the rule changes. 
These inferences are largely based on tests of coefficient estimates for the independent variable 
PostxOOC in table 7 of their article.   
 Kim and Klein report standard errors for coefficient estimates allowing the direct 
determination of two standard deviation confidence intervals for the PostxOOC coefficients as 
follows: 
  Restatement:                                 LB = -1.05;    UB = 0.366  
  Fraud Restatement:                      LB = -1.236;    UB = 0.860 
  Earnings Management:                LB  =  -0.014;  UB  = 0.014      . 
The first two sets of estimates are from logistic regressions. Hence, we convert the relevant values 
to likelihood ratios, yielding LBs of -65.00% and -70.95%.  That is, the evidence examined here 
is not a reliable basis for ruling out an alternative hypothesis that the rule change reduced 
restatement likelihoods by over 60% and fraudulent restatement likelihoods by over 70%. Hence, 
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while it certainly true that there is no reliable evidence that restatement likelihoods decreased, 
neither is there any reliable evidence to dispute contentions that they declined dramatically.21  
  As there is no obvious absolute scale for assessing what constitutes a high versus a low 
level of earnings management (EM) activity, evaluating the EM bounds is somewhat more of a 
challenge. Relative analysis, however, is still feasible. In this regard, table 3 of Kim and Klein 
indicates that the EM variable’s standard error is .071. Hence, the above lower bound value of -
0.012 amounts to around .197 of a one standard error in EM variation change. While this bound 
does not strike us as readily thought of as essentially equivalent to 0, it does seem to be rather 
small. Regrettably, Kim and Klein do not engage the question of why it should be so thought of in 
their analyses.  
Robinson, Stomberg, and Towery (2016) 
  Robinson et al. (2016) present four null outcomes. Here we focus on the first of these, 
which pertains to whether the relation between settlements and tax expense differs after the 
implementation of FIN 48 (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2006, ASC 740-10, Accounting 
for Uncertainty in Income Taxes). The key variable in this analysis is SETTLEIND*FIN48IND, 
reported in column 4 of their table 3. The estimated coefficient for this variable of 0.009 lacks 
significance at conventional levels, which the authors interpret as indicating that there is “no 
evidence that FIN 48 significantly changed the ability of income tax expense to predict future tax 
cash flows.”  
   As Robinson et al. do not report standard errors we again derive an estimate by dividing 
the estimated coefficient (0.009) by the reported t-value (1.55), yielding an estimated standard 
                                                          
21 Kim and Klein, as well as a number of other logistic based analyses, present ROC values. Such values evaluate 
the overall discriminatory validity of the model. They do not, however, speak to the discriminatory saliency of 
individual elements of the model, which is the core issue here, apart from the setting where the variable of interest is 
the sole explanatory variable (which is certainly not the case here).  
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error of .0058. Consequently, the pertinent two standard deviation confidence interval is -0.0026 
to +0.0206. These magnitudes are not in themselves inherently meaningful. However, as Robinson 
et al. in fact make use of, the estimated value of the stand-alone SETTLEIND effect of -0.024 is a 
particularly relevant basis for judging magnitude here. Specifically, the estimated interaction effect 
that is of central interest here is argued (under the alternative hypothesis) to be an offset to this 
stand-alone effect. Hence, we can divide the upper bound by the absolute value of this coefficient 
estimate to determine a plausible upper bound on the percentage of the effect that is being offset. 
Doing this yields an upper bound of 85.8%. Hence, a hypothesis that FIN 48 reduced the 
SETTLEIND effect that existed prior to its implementation by as much as 85% is not inconsistent 
with the examined evidence here. So, while the evidence is inconsistent with a conjecture that 
FIN48 fully eliminated the pre-existing SETTLEIND effect (i.e., a 100% reduction), that seems to 
be about the limit of what can be said about it. There is certainly no basis here to rule out alternative 
hypotheses claiming that FIN 48 had a rather consequential impact on the relation between 
settlements and tax rates.       
Lourenco (2016) 
   Lourenco examines how feedback interacts with other incentives in a field experiment 
setting, concluding that “feedback is independent of other incentives,” which is a form of a null 
outcome. Table 3 of her article presents her main results wherein all of the interactions involving 
the feedback indicator variable (FEED) lack significance. For purposes of this evaluation we focus 
on the specific null outcome for the three-way interaction MONEY*FEED*EXP, where MONEY 
indicates whether a monetary incentive is provided and EXP indicates whether the given 
observation is in a treatment or non-treatment state (determined weekly over time). The estimated 
effect for this variable is -6.91 with an associated standard error of 7.13. Consequently, its two 
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standard deviation confidence interval is -21.17 to 7.35. The dependent variable is sales 
performance measured by sales scaled by a baseline goal. Table 2 of the article indicates that this 
variable has a standard deviation of between 23 and 25. Dividing the upper and lower bounds of 
the confidence interval by these the midpoint of these two values, 24, yields a confidence interval 
measured as a percentage of a standard deviation of the dependent variable of -88.21% to +30.63%. 
While these magnitudes indicate that the evidence is not supportive of the presence of 
extraordinarily large conditional feedback effects, they hardly seem sufficiently small to argue that 
such effects are not materially present. .   
  Alternatively, one might evaluate the confidence interval here by using the statistically 
significant effect on the MONEY*EXP variable as a benchmark. That is, if FEED is fixed at 1 
rather than 0 then the MONEY*EXP effect equals the sum of the MONEY*EXP and 
MONEY*FEED*EXP coefficients. Hence, an operative question is whether a lower bound value 
for MONEY*FEED*EXP can flip the sign of the MONEY*EXP variable? And, in fact, it does 
just this. The MONEY*FEED estimate equals 13.30, which is substantially smaller in terms of 
absolute magnitude than the MONEY*FEED*EXP lower bound of -21.17. Hence, the evidence 
examined here is not inconsistent with the possibility that FEED flips the sign of the 
MONEY*EXP effect.  
Fredrickson and Zolotoy (2016) 
   Table 6 of Fredrickson and Zolotoy presents examinations of whether individual and 
institutional investors exhibit visibility driven queuing behavior in processing earnings 
announcements. They find statistically significant evidence of queuing in high individually held 
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firms but obtain a null outcome for high institutionally held firms.22 Based on this analysis they 
conclude that “competing earnings announcements do not distract institutional investors.” One of 
the key reported effects in their analysis is a value of +0.61 for the UExQUEUE_ABOVE variable. 
This effect should be negative if queuing is taking place, so this outcome is directionally consistent 
with their “conclusion.”  
  When we turn to confidence intervals, however, things get a good bit murkier. As 
Frederickson and Zolotoy do not provide standard errors we again resort to backing out an estimate 
based on the reported coefficient value and t-statistic. In this case we obtain an estimated standard 
error of 1.605. Hence, the two standard deviation confidence interval here has an LB of -2.60 and 
an UB of 3.82. An obvious benchmark for evaluating, in particular, the estimated LB is the reported 
UExQUEUE_ABOVE estimate for individual investor held firms. This value is -2.63. Hence, we 
cannot reliably rule out an alternative hypothesis that queueing effects among institutional held 
firms equal or exceed the best estimate of queueing effects among individual held firms.23 
Summary 
   Collectively, there are three distinct takeaways from the preceding confidence interval 
analyses. First, the effect-associated confidence interval supports the interpretation that the 
underlying effect is, at most, “small” in only one instance, the Kim and Klein earnings quality 
assessment. Hence, there is little support here for taking null outcomes as per se reliable indicators 
                                                          
22 This is a particularly well known form of the inferring the consequent fallacy in that a difference between two 
groups (a null rejection) is advanced based on based on separate analyses where one of the analyses results in a 
rejection of the null while the other results in a null outcome. See Gelman and Stern (2006) for a discussion.  
23 The reseach design framework employed by Fredrickson and Zolotoy is also of some relevance to the general 
theme of our study in that it is predicated on obtaining null outcomes in selected sub-groups. Interestingly, however, 
across tests the memberships of these sub-groups change such that firms that argued to have the effect in one test are 
included in the group that is argued to exhibit no effect at all in another test. That is, the only way the no effect null 
is possibly true is if it is true for all sub-groups examined, including those where it is expected to be (and, in fact is) 
rejected. Or, in other words, the design itself is inherently a self-contradiction. A self-contradiction that would not 
have occurred had the study simply avoided using a design built upon the dubious foundation of obtaining  null 
outcome “results.”  
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that the examined evidence shows that an underlying effect is substantively indistinguishable from 
the hypothesized null value or not materially consistent with the relevant alternative research 
hypothesis. Moreover, this inference is not unique to these five studies. Appendix C provides 
similar analyses for many of the other null outcome analyses identified in this paper. The picture 
there is no less severe. Null outcomes that, in our subjective assessment at least, pass under the “it 
is small” bar are rare.  
  Second, confidence interval analysis provides useful non-trivial insights about ranges of 
effect magnitudes that are consistent with the examined evidence. For instance, the Lennox (2106) 
analysis clearly indicates that the APTS rule implementation did not lead to a dramatic reduction 
in restatement likelihoods, since the relevant bound here is a roughly 20% reduction. In contrast, 
it is less clear whether such a less-than-dramatic decrease assertion fits the audit committee 
composition rule setting examined by Kim and Klein, since the possibility of a 60% reduction in 
restatement likelihood is not reliably ruled out by the evidence. Moreover, in both of these cases 
the confidence interval analyses make clear that there is more work to be done. Additional evidence 
needs to be collected, examined, and integrated that, in particular, will narrow these confidence 
interval ranges to a point where we can more tightly identify the range of likely effect magnitudes.  
  Third, on a stand-alone basis descriptive analyses tend to lack tension. A report that the 
evidence reliably indicates that a mandated change in audit committee composition decreased 
fraudulent restatement likelihoods by no more than 70.95% (our reinterpretation of Kim and Klein) 
clearly lacks the punch of a claim that the mandate “yields no benefits to investors.” (Caption of 
the AAA press release http://aaahq.org/Outreach/Newsroom/Press-Releases/11-1-17- for the Kim 
and Klein study.) Hence, judging the merits of such descriptive evidence of non-definitive-
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outcomes may require some adjustment to the current literature’s voracious appetite for tension in 
its publications.  
 
VII. MULTIPLE NULL OUTCOMES 
  In a number of cases the null outcomes we examine are reported in multiples. That is, there 
is a guiding overarching hypothesis that is evaluated using alternative measures or sub-samples, 
yielding multiple null outcomes and, in a few instances, a mixture of null and statistically 
significant opposite direction outcomes.24 At a very general level such collective null outcomes 
provide greater confidence in the possibility that any underlying effect(s) are either 
inconsequential or non-existent. However, formalizing the extent to which such collective 
outcomes heighten such confidence levels is highly situational. Just as is true for a stand-alone 
outcome, reliable interpretation of such multiple interrelated null outcomes demands a highly 
descriptive engagement with the evidence. For instance, suppose that three separate tests all yield 
null outcomes where there the associated upper bound is a 70% reduction in some undesirable 
behavior or outcome. These homogenous outcomes certainly instill confidence in the notion that 
this lower bound is likely a good bit smaller than 70%.25 However, it would take a much larger 
number of such tests (or tests with tighter ranges) to get anywhere close to the point of being able 
to think that any such effect is, at most, of negligible magnitude.26 
                                                          
24 In general, in multiple outcome settings where one or more of the tests result in opposite direction significance we 
only focus on the subset of null (statistically insignificant) outcomes. If the vast majority or all of the tests of a 
hypothesis result in opposite direction significance (see Lawrence, Siriviriyakul, and Sloan (2016) for an example), 
we viewed it as equivalent to a rejection of the null (i.e., we did not use it in our analysis). 
25 One particularly germane technique to evaluate such multi-outcome settings is meta-analysis (see Dyckman and 
Zeff for a discussion), which would also take into account any presumed underling non-independence across tests. 
Non-independence, in particular, makes it difficult to assess whether one can take each test as providing new 
information, which should affect beliefs, relative to simply re-reporting information already contained in the other 
tests, which should not affect beliefs.   
26 Moreover, there is no guarantee here that the null outcome will survive the multiple testing gauntlet as the 
heightened level of power that accompanies such testing means that smaller and smaller non-zero effects are reliably 
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   Moreover, three confounding factors tend to limit the uncertainty reduction properties of 
such multiple null outcome occurrences. First, they are commonly inherently redundant. Hence, 
from an informational perspective the second, third, or fourth test is often bringing in very little 
new descriptively relevant understanding of the underlying effects relative to what underlies the 
first test. For instance, Towery (2017) reports null outcomes using change in federal cash tax 
payments and change in total tax payments as alternative dependent variables. While the total tax 
payments measure certainly potentially adds something informative relative to the federal cash tax 
payments measure, it is unclear how much new information one of these measures adds relative to 
the other.   
 Second, they also often focus on subsets of the overall data where the effect, if it truly 
exists, is likely to be strongest. While rejections within such targeted subsets can provide 
persuasive evidence in favor of rejecting the null, the converse is not true. As they necessarily use 
less data than what is employed in the overall examinations, from a null outcome perspective they 
are again redundant, and, moreover, they are also less powerful, ceteris paribus, than examinations 
based on the entire set of available observations.27  
 Finally, in many cases it is unclear whether one should view these sorts of examinations as 
multiple tests of the same null hypothesis, in which case some sort of aggregation or accumulation 
of test outcomes could be appropriate, or as separate tests of specific distinct questions that reflect 
possible ways the overarching hypothesized effect might or might not manifest itself. That is, 
should the tests of earnings management and restatement likelihood effects reported in Klein and 
                                                          
detected. In fact, the general absence of any substantive efforts to collapse multiple null outcomes into single overall 
test outcomes speaks quite directly to the inappropriateness of using multiple null outcomes to advance a no effect 
conclusion.  
27 Absent ceteris paribus, they are possibly more powerful when the differential effect between the subsample-
included observations is analysis is large enough to offset the loss in power from the necessary decline in sample 
size.  
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Kim (2017) be taken as two separate tests of separate independent possible outcomes from the rule 
change? In which case they should be evaluated separately since neither is necessary for the other. 
Or, should they be taken as two tests evaluating a hypothesized common outcome of the rule 
change? In which case they can be aggregated, after taking into account the likely degree of joint-
ness they exhibit.28 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 In the widely accepted structure for conducting conventional statistics-based hypothesis 
testing null outcomes are appropriately interpreted as a basis for being unable to reject the null. 
The structure also quite clearly prohibits their use as a basis for making conclusive assertions 
regarding the truth of the associated null hypothesis. These precepts are repeated (twice) in the 
ASA Statement on Statistical Significance and P-Values.  A central takeaway from our analyses of 
how articles interpret the null outcomes they report is that the accounting literature has quite 
forgotten how to say “unable to reject,” but excels at violating the “is true” proscription. There is, 
to our knowledge, no methodological justification for this seemingly opportunistic departure from 
accepted statistical practice.  
  Descriptive inferential perspectives, on the other hand, do not impose the rigid interpretive 
structure on data analysis such as that mandated by conventional null hypothesis testing. However, 
they also do not typically provide a basis for somehow linking a null outcome with highly 
definitive assertions about an associated null or research hypothesis of interest. Substantive 
descriptive analysis can, through clear identification of the set of evidence-consistent alternative 
hypotheses, facilitate judgements as to as to whether the set of evidence-consistent alternatives are 
not substantively distinguishable from the stated null hypothesis. We, however, find little evidence 
                                                          
28 Note that if the underlying metrics are perfectly jointly determined (i.e., they always come together or none come 
at all) then they are also inherently perfectly redundant.  
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that articles in the accounting literature are pursuing such a descriptive path, particularly with 
respect to exercising judgement, when interpreting null outcomes. The typical analysis simply 
reports a large p-value or a small test statistic value along with a tabulated estimated effect, an 
effect that is rarely mentioned, to say nothing of discussed in the text in any meaningful way. It 
then directly proceeds to make some form of misleading claim of how such an outcome 
demonstrates the truth of the postulated null hypothesis.  
   Our analysis is also of some relevance to the ongoing debate about the degree to which the 
accounting academic literature is biased against publishing papers reporting null outcomes 
(Lindsay, 1994; Bamber, Christensen, and Gaver, 2000; Dyckman and Zeff, 2014). This “bias,” 
however, is inherent to the conventional hypothesis testing structure.29 And, without it the entire 
structure falls apart. The answer to this “bias,” in our opinion, is not to try and bend the rules of 
conventional hypothesis testing to form some sort of “equitable” counterbalance. Rather, to echo 
a point more broadly advanced by Dyckman and Zeff (2104, 2015) and Dyckman (2016), the 
answer is to shift to a descriptive perspective of data inference. That is, to adopt the position that 
there is considerable merit in establishing descriptive understandings of fundamentally interesting 
problems, questions, and settings. Indeed, we would argue that what is currently nominally 
identified as “bias against the null” is, in reality, a manifestation of a very pervasive “bias against 
descriptive analysis.” Descriptive is never going to match up with null hypothesis testing (when it 
returns null rejections) in terms of providing seemingly definitive yes/no answers to questions. 
                                                          
29 Interestingly, the underlying structure of hypothesis testing is firmly rooted in a bias in favor of the null. That is, 
the null is only rejected if the evidence is compellingly inconsistent with it. And, it is for precisely this reason that 
inferring the truth of the null from a null outcome is unacceptable. The tradeoff one makes when adopting a 
conventional hypothesis testing approach to inference is giving up on drawing reliable conclusive affirmative 
inferences about the truth of the null in exchange for possibly being able to make very reliable inferences about it 
being false or inconsistent with the evidence. From this perspective, complaining about bias against the null is a bit 
like complaining about paying for a lottery ticket that, after the fact, didn’t win the lottery.      
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And, in a publication environment where tension is critical, that is a rather severe handicap to 
operate under.  
   Finally, we advance the notion of reporting and examining confidence intervals as an initial 
step toward providing rigor to null outcome analysis. By focusing on the range of effects that are 
consistent with evidence, rather than a specific null hypothesis value (or range of null hypothesis 
values), confidence intervals discipline articles to describe any reported null outcomes in more 
representationally faithful fashions. It is, in particular, difficult to conceive of an article claiming 
a null hypothesis as “truth” at some point when the subsequent discussion of the evidence 
addresses a range of evidence-consistent values that include values directly contradicting such a 
claim. In fact, on a more general level, the literature would be far better served if authors, readers, 
and listeners when writing, or reading, or hearing statements such as “no relation”, “no evidence 
of”, “no change”, “no difference”, “insignificant”, “inconsistent”, “similar,” etc., would make it a 
a practice to ask the question—“Is there a confidence interval for that?”    
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Table 1 
Null Outcome Articles in The Accounting Review: 2016-2017 
Article Area Design Number of Null 
Outcomes 
Number 
Stated as 
Null Hyp. In Paper In Abstract 
Bills et al. (2017) Audit Archival 2 2 0 
Brasel et al. (2016) Audit Exper. 2 2 1 
Brazel et al. (2016) Audit Exper. 1 1 0 
Cannon & Bedard (2017) Audit Exper.  7 0 2 
Casas-Arce et al. (2017) Man. Archival 1 1 1 
Chen et al. (2016) Financial Archival 1 1 0 
Choi et al. (2016) Managerial Exper.  2 1 0 
DeFond et al. (2016) Audit Archival 1 0 0 
Drake et al. (2016) Tax Archival 1 1 0 
Dutta & Patatoukas (2017) Financial Archival 1 1 1 
Erickson et al. (2017) Financial Exper.  1 0 1 
Farrell et al. (2017) Method Exper. 3 2 1 
Francis et al. (2017) Audit Archival 1 1 0 
Frederickson & Zolotoy (2016) Financial Archival 3 3 1 
Gong et al. (2016) Audit Archival 1 1 1 
Guenther et al. (2017) Tax Archival 2 2 0 
Hall (2016) Financial Archival 1 0 1 
Henry & Leone (2016) Financial Archival 1 1 1 
Humphreys et al. (2016) Managerial Exper.  2 2 0 
Kelly et al. (2017) Managerial Exper. 1 1 0 
Khan et al. (2016) Financial Archival 1 1 0 
Kim and Klein (2017) Audit Archival 5 2 0 
Krishnan et al. (2017) Audit Archival 1 1 1 
Laurion et al. (2017) Audit Archival 1 1 0 
Lennox (2016)30 Audit Archival 3 3 3 
Li et al. (2017) Audit Archival 1 1 1 
Lin and Wang (2016) Financial Archival 2 2 0 
Lourenco (2016) Managerial Exper.  2 2 2 
Nelson et al. (2016) Audit Exper. 2 1 0 
Nessa (2017) Tax Archival 1 1 0 
Patatoukas and Thomas (2016) Financial Archival 1 0 1 
Robinson et al. (2016) Financial Archival 3 2 1 
Schroeder & Shepardson (2016) Audit Archival 1 0 0 
Towery (2017) Tax Archival 1 1 1 
Wieczynska (2016) Financial Archival 3 2 0 
  Totals   63 43 21 
      
% Articles Non-Zero    82.9% 48.6% 
 
                                                          
30 Lennox tests a single broadly stated hypothesis using three measures. As his discussion and analysis varies by 
measure we treat these as three separate hypotheses for purposes of our analyses.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistic Presentations for Null Outcomes 
                                                          
31 Group means and standard deviations are tabulated for one of the null outcomes. Standard errors of differences in 
means are not reported.  
32 Tests of alternative non-zero benchmarks are conducted, establishing that any underlying effect that may be 
present is smaller than these (rather large) benchmarks. 
 
 
 
Article 
# 
of Null 
Out-
comes 
Reports 
CI or 
Range 
Analysis 
Reports 
Std. 
Error  
Text Presentation 
Value of 
Estimated 
Effect 
 
Other 
Descr. 
Test stat. 
Or p-value 
Bills et al.  2 0 0 0 0 1 
Brasel et al. 2 0 0 2 0 2 
Brazel et al. 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Cannon & Bedard  7 0 0 0 0 0 
Casas-Arce et al. 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Chen et al. 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Choi et al.  2 0 2 2 0 2 
DeFond et al.  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Drake et al.  1 0 0 0 1 0 
Dutta & Patatoukas 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Erickson et al.  1 0 0 0 0 1 
Farrell et al. 3 0 0 3 0 3 
Francis et al.  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Frederickson&Zolotoy 3 0 0 0 0 2 
Gong et al.  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Guenther et al.  2 0 0 0 0 0 
Hall  1 0 0 1 1 0 
Henry & Leone 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Humphreys et al.  2 0 031 1 0 2 
Kelly et al.  1 0 0 0 0 1 
Khan et al.  1 0 0 1 0 0 
Kim and Klein  5 0 5 1 0 1 
Krishnan et al.  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Laurion et al. 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Lennox  3 032 0 1 3 3 
Li et al.  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Lin & Wang 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Lourenco  2 0 2 0 0 0 
Nelson et al.  2 0 0 1 0 2 
Nessa 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Patatoukas & Thomas  1 0 0 0 1 0 
Robinson et al.  3 0 0 1 1 3 
Schroeder&Shepardson 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Towery  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Wieczynska 3 0 3 0 0 0 
  Totals 63 0 11 16 12 24 
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This table reports what specific information items are and are not provided by articles for the null outcomes 
they report. In cases where a paper reports multiple null outcomes counts are provided where the maximum 
value is the paper’s number of null outcomes (as listed in the second column of the table). Text presentation 
columns refer to the item being reported in the text of the paper, not to tabulated presentations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 # 
of Null 
Out-
comes 
Reports 
CI or 
Range 
Analysis 
Reports 
Std. 
Error  
Text Presentation 
Value of 
Estimated 
Effect 
 
Other 
Descr. 
Test stat. 
Or p-value 
% Articles Non-Zero  0% 14.3% 34.3% 25.7% 37.1% 
% Outcomes Non-Zero  0% 17.5% 25.4% 19.0% 38.1% 
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Table 3 
 
Text Discussion of Null Outcomes in Article Abstracts 
 
 
Article Null Outcome Statement Type 
Bills et al.  1. “as evidenced by a lack of an audit pricing adjustment” 
2. “we do not find evidence of a deterioration in audit quality” 
PC 
SC 
Brasel et al. 1. “we find that CAM disclosures only reduce auditor liability for 
undetected misstatements that, absent CAM disclosure, are relatively 
difficult to foresee” 
2. “CAM disclosures that are unrelated to subsequent misstatements 
neither increase nor reduce auditor liability judgments relative to the 
current regime.” 
 
PC 
 
 
PC 
Brazel et al.  “consultation did not effectively mitigate the outcome effect” PC 
Casas-Arce et 
al.  
“the use of CLV did not negatively impact pricing” (note, this is linked with a 
similar assertion regarding default risk that is not subjected to statistical 
testing.) 
PC 
Chen et al.  “the financial reporting quality of U.S. RM firms is similar” GC 
Choi et al.  “with similar performance in the latter two tournaments” GC 
Drake et al.  “Deloitte’s clients report valuation allowances and UTB balances that 
are not significantly different than other annually inspected auditors” 
GC 
Dutta & 
Patatoukas 
 A series of placebo tests provides additional support for the construct 
validity 
GC 
Farrell et al. 1. “online workers are at least as willing as students”  
2. “performance-based wages, which are just as effective in inducing 
high effort as high fixed wages” 
PC 
 
PC 
Francis et al.  “we find no effect resulting from the forced auditor changes” PC 
Frederickson 
& Zolotoy  
1. “We find no support for queuing based on the latter” 
2. “Earnings announcements made by firms that are more visible…—
but not by firms that are less visible—mitigate” 
3. “individual investors—not institutional investors—drive the queuing 
effect.” 
SC 
 
PC 
 
PC 
Gong et al. “unaccompanied by a deterioration in audit quality” PC 
Guenther et al.  “measures of tax avoidance …are generally not associated with” 
 1. “future tax rate volatility” or 
2. “future overall firm risk” 
 
PC 
PC 
Henry & 
Leone 
1. “word-frequency tone measures are as powerful as the Naıve 
Bayesian machine-learning tone measure from Li (2010)” 
 
PC 
Humphreys et 
al.  
1. “For managers presented with causal linkages with delays, long-term profit 
generation is higher than the control group, but is not significantly different 
from the causal linkages without delays treatment” 
2. “Learning is found to plateau for the causal linkages without delays 
treatment and is not present for the control group.” 
GC 
 
 
PC 
Lin & Wang 1. “but not to innovation efficiency”  
2.  “but not the innovation efficiency premium”  
PC 
PC 
Kelly et al. “We do not find significant effects of reward type” GC 
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This table reports descriptions of null outcomes identified in 29 article abstracts. Each description 
is classified into one of the following five types based on its conclusive nature: Precisely 
Conclusive (PC), Generally Conclusive (GC), Selectively Conclusive (SC), Arguably Conclusive 
(AC), and Non-Conclusive (NC). See appendix A for further details on each of these categories.   
  
Article Null Outcome Statement Type 
Khan et al.  “firms with good ratings on immaterial sustainability issues do not 
significantly outperform firms with poor ratings on the same issues” 
GC 
Kim and Klein  “we find no evidence of 
1. “higher market value or” 
2. “better financial reporting quality” 
 
SC 
SC 
Krishnan et al.  “we find no systematic differences for accruals or for value relevance” PC 
Laurion et al. “we find no evidence of a change in the frequency” SC 
Lennox  “I find no change in audit quality”  
(for 1. accounting misstatements; 
 2. tax-related misstatements; 
 3. going concern opinion likelihoods. 
 
PC 
PC 
PC 
Li et al. “we find little evidence that an audit failure also casts doubt” GC 
Lourenco 1. “feedback is independent of the other incentives” 
2. “feedback in the form of knowledge of results has no impact” 
PC 
PC 
Nelson et al.  1.“but not by concerns about the … repercussions” PC 
Nessa  “I do not find evidence that repatriation tax costs decrease U.S. MNCs’ share 
repurchases” 
SC 
Robinson et al.  1. “we find no evidence that FIN 48 increased …” 
2. “we find no evidence that investors identify ….” 
SC 
SC 
Towery  “firms ……do not claim fewer income tax benefits…” PC 
Wieczynska  1. “adoption is not associated with an increase …” (before adoption) 
2. “adoption is not associated with an increase …” (after adoption) 
PC 
PC 
     
Articles with PC descriptions of null outcomes in abstract   18 
Percentage of abstract identified null outcomes presented as PC    62.8% 
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Table 4 
Textual Analysis of Article Discussions of Null Outcomes 
Article Null Hypothesis Description Counts by Conclusive Nature 
 PC GC SC AC NC 
Bills et al. 5 1 4 1 0 
Brasel et al. 3 0 0 2 0 
Brazel et al.  4 0 0 3 0 
Cannon & Bedard  8 3 1 0 1 
Casas-Arce et al.  2 1 1 0 0 
Chen et al.  4 3 2 0 0 
Choi et al.  4 4 0 0 0 
DeFond et al.  3 1 0 0 0 
Drake et al.  2 3 0 0 0 
Dutta & Patatoukas 1 0 3 0 0 
Erickson et al.  3 0 0 0 0 
Farrell et al.  3 4 5 4 0 
Francis et al.  3 2 0 0 0 
Frederickson & Zolotoy  5 0 6 3 0 
Gong et al.  3 1 0 0 0 
Guenther et al.  3 9 4 0 0 
Hall  1 0 2 0 0 
Henry & Leone 0 4 0 0 1 
Humphreys et al. 4 1 2 0 0 
Kelly et al.  5 1 1 0 0 
Khan et al.  3 1 0 0 0 
Kim and Klein  6 4 10 2 0 
Krishnan et al.  3 1 3 1 0 
Laurion et al.  1 3 0 0 0 
Lennox  0 5 3 0 0 
Li et al.  1 4 1 0 0 
Lin & Wang 7 1 0 0 0 
Lourenco  5 0 4 3 0 
Nelson et al.  5 1 1 0 0 
Nessa 4 1 3 0 0 
Patatoukas and Thomas  3 1 0 0 0 
Robinson et al.  3 5 5 0 0 
Schroeder & Shepardson  3 1 2 1 0 
Towery  1 1 2 0 0 
Wieczynska  4 0 1 0 0 
  Totals 115 67 66 20 2 
  Articles 33 27 23 9 2 
 
This table summarizes how article texts (excluding the abstract) describe null outcomes. Counts are 
provided by article for five distinct descriptive types: Precisely Conclusive (PC), Generally Conclusive 
(GC), Selectively Conclusive (SC), Arguably Conclusive (AC), and Non-Conclusive (NC). See appendix 
A for further details on each of these categories.   
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Appendix A 
Classification of Null Outcome Text Discussions 
 
Classification Definitions and Examples 
PC: Precisely 
Conclusive 
Definitive statements that the null is precisely true or the alternative is 
unconditionally false. Examples: did not, is no difference, find no 
effect, equals…, unaccompanied by, (alternative) is rejected; not 
different from, independent, no association, inconsistent with 
(alternative), etc. 
GC: Generally 
Conclusive 
Statements indicating that any effect is negligible or inconsequential. 
Examples: insignificant (w/o any statistical reference); small, little, 
similar, etc. 
SC: Selectively 
Conclusive 
Statements that selectively point out that outcome is: (1) consistent 
with null or, (2) unsupportive of alternative. Examples: Consistent with 
null; find no evidence for alternative, find no support for, etc.  
AC: Arguably 
Conclusive 
Statements that can be taken as conclusive, although it is not clear that 
they are or are intended to be. Example: Statistically Insignificant. 
NC: Non-conclusive Clearly inconclusive statements. Examples: Unable to reject; lacks 
statistical significance, not reliably different, unclear, etc.  
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Appendix B 
Listing of Hypotheses, Predictions. and Questions Associated with Null Outcomes 
 
Article # Hypothesis/Question 
Bills et al.  2 1. “H3: Audit fees will increase to a lesser extent for companies with a new 
CEO who is considered an heir apparent before taking office than for 
companies with a new CEO who is an insider, but not considered an heir 
apparent before taking office.” (p. 30) (this exact hypothesis is rejected, but 
the test gives rise to the null outcome of an insignificant effect relative to fees 
when there is no change in CEO that underlies the abstract assertion of a 
“lack of an audit pricing adjustment”. 
2. “We next examine whether uncertainty due to CEO succession is 
associated with audit quality.” (p. 40) 
Brasel et al.  2 1. “but (do) not (observe a significant decrease) within restoration liability.” 
(p.1351/2) (partial null outcome for H1.) 
2. “How do jurors’ auditor liability judgments compare when the audit report 
discloses a CAM that is unrelated to the undetected misstatement versus when 
the audit report is silent regarding CAMs?” (p. 1349) 
Brazel et al. 1 H2:” When subordinate auditors consult with their superiors during the 
course of exercising skepticism, the outcome effect in auditor evaluations is 
reduced.” (p. 1582) 
Cannon & 
Bedard  
7 1. H2: “Auditors will be more likely to use a valuation specialist to assist the 
engagement team as estimation uncertainty for the FVM increases.” (p.86) 
2. H5b: “The likelihood of booking an audit adjustment that decreases income 
will not differ based on the estimation uncertainty for the FVM.” (p. 87) 
3. H6b: The likelihood of booking an audit adjustment that decreases income 
will not differ based on the level of inherent and control risk assessments for 
the FVM. (p. 87) 
4. H7a: The likelihood of auditors discussing a possible audit adjustment with 
client management will increase when a valuation specialist is used by the 
engagement team. 
5. H7b: The likelihood of booking an audit adjustment that decreases income 
will increase when a valuation specialist is used by the engagement team (p. 
88) 
6. H8a: The likelihood of auditors discussing a possible audit adjustment with 
client management will increase when an independent estimate of the FVM is 
developed. (p. 88) 
7.  H8b: The likelihood of booking an audit adjustment that decreases income 
will increase when an independent estimate of the FVM is developed. (p. 88) 
Casas Arce et 
al. 
1 “Our model predictions with respect to price (or, equivalently, to credit risk) 
are ambiguous.” (p. 37).  
Chen et al. 1 H1: Ceteris paribus, the ﬁnancial reporting quality of U.S. RM ﬁrms is lower 
than that of U.S. IPO ﬁrms/We find that the financial reporting quality of U.S. 
RM firms is similar to that of matched U.S. IPO firms (p. 1368) 
Choi et al.  2 1. H3b: When dynamic task complexity is high, strategy experimentation is 
greater in a hybrid tournament than in a grand tournament. (p. 1396) 
2. RQ1b: When dynamic task complexity is high, does performance in a 
hybrid tournament differ from performance in a grand tournament? (p. 1397) 
(Grand Similar to Hybrid) in abstract. 
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33 Guenther et al. examine three main hypotheses using multiple measures of tax avoidance. For the first hypothesis 
significant opposite (of directional null) effects are widespread. This outcome is excluded from the analysis. For the 
remaining two hypotheses significant opposite effects are found for a few of the measures, while the remaining 
measures yield null outcomes. We treat these latter two hypotheses as encompassing null outcomes. 
DeFond et al. 2 “we find that auditors do not strategically respond to unconditional 
conservatism by adjusting their fees, GCO frequency, or propensity to 
resign.” (p. 71) 
 “We also find that unconditional conservatism is not associated with lawsuits 
against auditors or client restatements” (p. 71) 
Drake et al.  1 “we conduct our tests of valuation allowances and UTBs in subsequent years 
and note that Deloitte clients continue to report similar levels of valuation 
allowance as clients of other annually inspected auditors” (p. 1412) 
Dutta & 
Patatoukas 
1 “Next, we introduce construct validity tests using 
placebo test variables that should be free of the effect of conditional 
conservatism.” (p. 208) 
Erickson et al.  1 H1: (partial) “will perceive relatively high risk only when both 
operating cash flows and earnings are volatile” (p. 141) 
Farrell et al. 3 1. H1a: Workers in online labor markets report their private information less 
honestly than do students. (p. 97) 
2.  H1b: Workers in online labor markets exert less effort than do students. (p. 
97) 
3. H2b: When tasks are more intrinsically interesting, the efforts of workers 
in online labor markets will not differ between performance-based and ﬂat 
wages.  (p. 98) (partial support, partial no support) 
Francis et al.  1  Finally, we find no effect resulting from the forced auditor changes due to 
Arthur Andersen.  (abstract) This is an untabulated analysis highlighted 
throughout the paper. 
Frederickson 
& Zolotoy 
3 1. H1: Find no support for queuing based on the latter (Abstract) 
2. H1: The number of announcing ﬁrms queued above ﬁrm i will be 
associated positively with the degree of market distraction, whereas the 
number of announcing ﬁrms queued below ﬁrm i will not distract the market 
(p. 443) 
3. (The queuing effect will be less pronounced for institutional investors than 
for individual investors, p. 444) Analyzed as additional analysis, states that 
individual investors—not institutional investors—drive the queuing effect. 
(Abstract) 
Gong et al.  1 we need to show that a reduction in audit hours due to audit ﬁrm mergers is 
not accompanied by any deterioration in audit quality; unaccompanied by a 
deterioration in audit quality, (p. 474) 
Guenther et 
al.33  
2 1. H1b: Low effective tax rates are positively associated with future tax rate 
volatility. (p. 119) (2 signif. in opposite direction outcomes, 5 null outcomes) 
2. H2: Lower effective tax rates are positively associated with future stock 
price volatility.  (p. 120) (3 sign. In opposite direction, 6 null outcomes). 
Hall  1 I ﬁnd no evidence that reducing labor costs in response to ﬁnancial reporting 
and regulatory pressure affects future performance. (p. 1672) 
Henry & 
Leone 
2 1. “Our tests of alternative weighting methods for word-frequency tone 
measures compare the equal weighting method based solely on word 
frequencies (wf) and the inverse document frequency (idf) weighting method 
advocated in Loughran and McDonald (2011)” (p.155) 
2. “we next compare word-count tone measures with the machine- 
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learning measure used in Li (2010)” (p. 155) 
Humphreys et 
al.  
2. 1. “H2b: Managers presented with a set of strategic objectives with causal 
linkages and delays will generate higher performance on a dynamic task than 
those presented with the same objectives without delays.” (p. 1446) 
2. “A general linear model (GLM) repeated measures within-subjects analysis 
of learning rates is also conducted.” (p 1454) 
Kelly et al.  1 H1: Total sales performance for both tournaments will be higher for retailers 
eligible for tangible rewards than retailers eligible for cash rewards (p. 170) 
Khan et al.  1 “firms with high residual changes on immaterial sustainability topics 
do not outperform firms with low residual changes on the same 
topic” (p. 1698) 
Kim and 
Klein  
5 1. Overall: “We ﬁrst test for signiﬁcant differences in stock returns between 
ﬁrms in and out of compliance in 1998. (p. 194) 
2. Benefits: “If non-compliant ﬁrms with relatively poor ﬁnancial reporting 
quality beneﬁt most from the 1999 rules, then the coefﬁcients b3 in Equation 
(3a) and b4 and b5 in Equation (3b) will be signiﬁcantly positive for ﬁrms 
with restatements or with higher earnings management. (p. 195) 
3. Costs. “We include these three variables as our cost variables in Equations 
(3a) and (3b), and predict negative coefﬁcients on b5 in Equation (3a) and b7 
and b8 in Equation (3b).” (p.196) 
4. “We ﬁnd no evidence that out-of-compliance ﬁrms with higher earnings 
management (ﬁnancial reporting quality) or restatements (audit quality) prior 
to the proposed changes earned higher returns than out-of-compliance ﬁrms 
with better ﬁnancial reporting quality.” (p. 188) 
5. “We measure whether desired changes (less earnings management, fewer 
restatements, less fraud) are seen after the implementation of the 1999 rules" 
(p.204) 
Krishnan et al.  1 RQ3: “For clients cross-listed in the U.S., does the inspection effect on audit 
quality differ for inspection reports with and without audit deﬁciencies?” (p. 
149) 
Laurion et al. 1 H1: “Audit partner rotation is associated with ……a decrease in 
misstatements.” (p. 214) 
Lennox  3 “There is no change in audit quality after companies reduce their APTS 
purchases following the new rules.” (p. 1497) 
In our own language: 
1.  No change in accounting misstatements 
2.   No change in tax-related misstatements 
3. No change in going concern opinion likelihoods 
Li et al.  1  We compare the audit quality of non-failed auditors who are in the same 
ofﬁce as a failed auditor and that of auditors in ofﬁces that do not experience 
audit failures. (p. 138)   
Lin & Wang 2. 1. “We find that a firm’s innovation efficiency… is not related to its 
likelihood of becoming a takeover target” (p. 957) 
2. “We expect and find that takeover risk is not responsible for the abnormal 
return associated with innovation efficiency” (p. 957) 
Lourenco  2 1.  H1: There is no interaction between monetary incentives and performance 
feedback in terms of their impact on performance; that is, monetary 
incentives and feedback are independent. (p. 283) 
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2. H2: There is no interaction between recognition and performance feedback 
in terms of their impact on performance; that is, recognition and feedback are 
independent. (p. 284)  
Nelson et al.  2 1. H3: Alignment between issue and supervisor concerns has less of an effect 
on an auditor’s willingness to speak up about an issue when the auditor’s 
supervisor is more team-oriented. (p. 1786) 
2. Experiment 4: Analyses examine the extent to which the effect of team-
oriented leadership on assessed willingness to speak up is mediated by three 
distinct constructs suggested by prior management research: team members’ 
(1) team identiﬁcation, (2) leader commitment, and (3) concern over 
consequences associated with speaking up. (p. 1782) 
Nessa  1 H2: Repatriation tax costs are negatively associated with the level of share 
repurchases by U.S. MNCs. (p. 221) 
Patatoukas & 
Thomas  
1 Figure 1 “Predict upward bias, which should explain PT’s lagged earnings 
bias.” (p. 627) 
Robinson et al.  3 Overall for 1. And 2.: The ability of income tax expense to predict future tax 
cash ﬂows does not change as a result of FIN 48. (p. 1199) 
1.  observing a change in how settlements affect tax expense from pre- to 
post-FIN 48 provides evidence that FIN 48 changed the way income tax 
expense maps into future cash tax outﬂows (p. 1206) 
2. We estimate this series of equations using our full sample of ﬁrms (and 
subsamples of ﬁrms most likely affected by FIN 48). Observing signiﬁcant 
changes in the predictive ability of tax expense for future tax cash ﬂows in the 
FIN 48 regime for these subsamples provides evidence consistent with 
differences across time being attributable to FIN 48 rather than other factors 
(p. 1208) (some sub-samples are opposite direction significant) 
3.If investors correctly determine when excess reserves are incorporated into 
ﬁrms’ tax expense accruals, then the level of tax expense should be less 
negatively related to levels of expected future cash outﬂows. Therefore, we 
would expect a positive coefﬁcient on TaxExpense SubSample. On the other 
hand, if investors do not distinguish among these two types of ﬁrms, then the 
coefﬁcient on TaxExpense SubSample should be no different from zero. (p. 
1212) 
Schroeder 
&Shepardson 
1 H2: Management assessments of internal controls over ﬁnancial reporting are 
associated with internal control system quality improvements. (p. 1518) 
Towery  1 H1: Claims for uncertain tax positions do not change in response to Schedule 
UTP (p. 205) 
Wieczynska 3 1. (H3b): The likelihood of switching from small audit ﬁrms to global ones 
increases in the year of IFRS adoption in countries with … (weak) regulatory 
regimes. (p. 1262) 
2. H4a …: The likelihood of switching from small audit ﬁrms to global ones 
increases one year …. before IFRS adoption in countries with strong ….. 
regulatory regimes. (p. 1262) 
3. (H4b): The likelihood of switching from small audit ﬁrms to global ones 
increases …. (two years) before IFRS adoption in countries with ….. (weak) 
regulatory regimes. (p. 1262) 
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Appendix C 
 
Supplemental Confidence Interval Analyses of Null Outcomes 
 
Article Confidence Interval Analysis 
Bills et al.  Table 4 of Bills et al. reports the analysis of the relation between heir new 
CEOs and audit fee changes. The estimated coefficient on New CEO Heir is 
+0.019. The implied standard error for this estimate is 0.015. Hence a two 
standard error confidence interval for the effect on fee change is -0.023 to 
+0.053.  The same analysis reports that the estimated mean effect of the CEO 
change being to an outsider is a 9.86% increase in fee. Hence, this analysis is 
unable to reject a null that the new CEO heir fee effects are as much as 50% of 
the fee increases experienced when an outsider CEO is hired. While this effect 
is certainly smaller (consistent with the rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
difference in audit fee change), in context it does not seem at all consistent 
with assertions that there is a reliable basis in the reported evidence for 
believing that the New CEO Heir fee effect is immaterial or non-existent.  
Brasel et al.  Brasel et al. evaluate the impact of the auditor reporting an unrelated CAM on 
verdict outcomes. The baseline (control) estimated level is a negligent 
judgement 42.1 % of the time. This estimated level drops to 36.4% when an 
unrelated CAM is reported by the auditor, a decline of 5.7 percentage points. . 
The standard error for this estimate is around 6% points. Hence, the estimated 
confidence interval for the effect ranges from -17.7 percentage points to + 6.3 
percentage points. It is quite difficult to fathom how one credibly advances a 
claim that unrelated CAMs “neither increase nor reduce auditor liability 
judgements” is a plausible interpretation of such evidence.  
Brazel et al. OutcomeXConsult lacks significance in Table 2 leading to the conclusion that 
“outcome bias is not mitigated by either form of consultation.”  Neither effects 
or t-values are reported. Hence, it is effectively impossible to construct 
confidence intervals based on the provided information. 
Cannon & 
Bedard  
Canon and Bedard obtain a number of null outcomes. But their analysis is 
based on a small sample size and low explanatory power models. 
Consequently, they obtain low precision estimates as a matter of course. 
Hence, effects must be sizable to have much chance of being reliably detected 
in this analysis. As a representative example, we evaluate their examination of 
the likelihood that a valuation specialist is used when Level 3 assets are 
present. The estimated effect reported in table 4 for this examination is -0.73, 
which certainly does not favor the notion that a valuation specialist are called 
in due to the presence of Level 3 assets. However, the implied standard error 
for this estimate is a rather substantial 0.97. Hence, the two standard error 
upper bound on this estimate is +1.21. Or, in terms of likelihoods, roughly 
235%. Hence, based on the evidence considered in this analysis we cannot 
reliably rule out the possibility that the presence of level 3 assets increases the 
likelihood that a valuation specialist is consulted by 235%. This level of in-
precision hardly seems the basis for asserting that there is no association 
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between LEVEL3 and the use of a specialist as representing a “key result” or a 
“new finding”.  (p.106) 
Casas-Arce 
et al.  
Table 9 of Casas-Arce et al reports its analysis of the determinants of mortgage 
pricing. Its no decrease in price inference rests on the fact that the difference 
between the Branch and internet Mortgages Base Post-CLV coefficient 
estimates of +0.346 lacks significance (fn. 23). The reported standard errors 
for the two coefficient estimates are 0.434 to 0.770. Hence, an estimator for 
the standard error for the difference in mean between the two groups is the 
square root of the sum of these two values, 1.051. The associated two standard 
error confidence interval for the difference in the change in pricing is from -
1.754 Basis points to +2.447 basis points. While such values certainly strike us 
as small, they are also arising in what seems to be a highly competitive market 
setting. In highly competitive settings pricing differences are generally 
expected to be rather tiny.   
Chen et al. Chen et al. (2016) test the null hypothesis that the financial reporting quality of 
U.S. reverse merger (RM) firms does not differ from that of U.S. IPO firms 
using four accounting quality measures: restatements; accounting errors, 
accounting irregularities, and a battery of five accrual quality measures. Based 
on the null outcomes from these tests they conclude that in terms of accounting 
quality U.S. RM firms “do not differ from” U.S. IPO firms. This conclusion is 
important for their analysis as it allows them to avoid specifying how to 
meaningfully equate differences in reporting quality for U. S. firms with 
differences in reporting quality for Chinese firms. The results are presented in 
their table 3 and table 4, as measured by the coefficients for the RM variable.  
 
The estimated effects of the RM process for these variables are presented in 
tables 3 and 4 of their paper. In this analysis we exclude the last two accrual-
based measures in table 4 because we could not devise a reasonable approach 
to assess their magnitudes given the limited amount of descriptive information 
available to us. In terms of the first three measures (all restatements, 
accounting errors, accounting irregularities) the RM effect estimates are 0.593, 
0.696, and 0.244. All three are positive, which is directionally consistent with 
RM firms exhibiting lower reporting quality than IPO firms. As these are all 
from logit regressions, we can convert their estimates into odds ratios of 
80.94% more likely to restate, 100.57% more likely to experience an 
accounting error, and are 27.6% more likely to report irregularities. While 
these effects lack statistical significance, they most certainly are not near 0. 
Hence, it is hard to see how they justify an inference that there is no difference 
or even only a small difference in quality between U.S. IPO and RM firms.   
The three accrual quality measures that are evaluatable are: absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (DA), the absolute value of working capital accruals 
(DD), and the absolute value of discretionary revenue (DR) into our analysis. 
The estimated effects for these three measures are -0.008, 0.006, and 0.001 
respectively. Taking the means of matched U.S. IPO firms from their table 1 
as scaling variable (0.17, 0.08, and 0.07) the RM relative to IPO differences 
are around -4.7%, 7.5%, and 1.4% of their mean values.These do not seem 
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particularly large, so, at the magnitude of effect level, the differences are 
arguably small. Further, we generate two standard deviation confidence 
intervals for these six RM estimates by first dividing the reported effect by its 
associated z-value or t-value, as standard error estimates are not directly 
reported. This yields standard error estimates of 0.371, 0.470, 0.841, 0.015, 
0.010, and 0.009, respectively. Then, the following two standard deviation 
confidence intervals are obtained: 
(1) All restatements: LB = -0.149; UB = 1.335 
(2) Accounting errors: LB = -0.244; UB = 1.636 
(3) Accounting irregularities: LB = -1.438; UB = 1.926 
(4) The absolute value of DA: LB = -0.038; UB = 0.022 
(5) The absolute value of DD: LB = -0.014; UB = 0.026 
(6) The absolute value of DR: LB = -0.017; UB = 0.019 
 
Converting the first three of these into odds ratios gives us: 
(1) All restatements: LB= -13.84%; UB = +280.00%; 
(2) Accounting errors: LB = -21.65%; UB = +413.46%; 
(3) Accounting irregularities: LB = -76.25%; UB = +586.20%. 
 
The upper bound values, which are particularly relevant in the context of this 
analysis, here are astronomical.  It is not clear how one can say much of 
anything at all substantive here at all against the possibility that U.S. RM firms 
have far higher restatement, error, and irregularity rates than do U.S. IPO 
firms. 
 
For the three accrual quality measures the mean value scaled UBs are 12.94%, 
32.5%, and 27.14%. That is, the presented evidence here does not rule out the 
possibility that the accrual quality of IPO firms is as much as 32.5% higher 
than the accrual quality of RM firms. Hence, there again does not seem to be a 
very plausible basis for thinking that we can reliably infer that the difference 
between IPO and RM firms here is small. 
Choi et al.  Table 2 of Choi et al. presents a null outcome with respect to whether a 
difference in the level of strategy experimentation differs between participants 
in the grand tournament setting and participants in the hybrid tournament 
setting. The estimated mean difference in strategy experimentation is 0.30 with 
an associated standard error of 0.34. Hence, the two standard error confidence 
interval for this difference is from -0.38 to +0.98. There are two plausible 
scales available here for evaluating these magnitudes. The first is the estimated 
mean value of experimentation across the two groups, which seems to be 
around 4.0. Using 4.0 as a scale results in a scaled confidence interval of -
9.5% to +24.5%. Alternatively, the standard deviation for the experimentation 
variable seems to be roughly 1.1. Using this value to scale the bounds gives a 
confidence interval in units of the underlying variable’s standard deviation of 
between -34.55% and +89.10%. While these bounds seem to reliably rule out 
the possibility of moderately lower and substantially larger experimentation 
means in the grand experiment, they do not seem nearly precise enough to 
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infer that the level of strategy experimentation is similar in the two 
tournaments.   
DeFond et 
al. 
An absence of descriptive information for the independent unconditional 
conservatism measures precludes substantive descriptive analysis of the 
reported coefficients and associated (not reported but estimable) confidence 
intervals. The paper’s companion conditional conservatism tests employ decile 
ranks. If the unconditional conservatism measures are also decile-ranked then 
meaningful descriptive analyses of effect sizes and likely ranges is feasible 
from the reported numbers. However, the text of the paper never states that 
this is done, and some language used actually implies that “as is” rather than 
transformed variables are used. Moreover, simple inspection of the reported 
magnitudes and associated test statistics strongly suggests that transformations 
are not used in these analyses. In particular, if rank transformations are 
assumed, estimated effect magnitudes are seemingly astronomical for one of 
the two unconditional conservatism measures and remarkably miniscule for 
the other. 
Drake et al. Table 6 of Drake et al. examines UTB (uncertain tax benefit) and change in 
UTB values for Deloitte clients relative to these values for other clients by 
year. As pertinent descriptive information is provided for UTB we focus on 
this set of results here. The 2012 estimated UTB difference for Deloitte is 
 -0.0011, which is consistent with Deloitte clients actually reporting lower 
UTB values (which favors the authors’ position that the UTB values of 
Deloitte clients are no longer higher than the clients of other auditors.) The 
two standard error upper bound on this estimate is +0.0007. Given that average 
UTB level is 0.013 with a standard deviation of 0.023 it seems reasonable to 
view this upper bound value of being quite small, consistent with the generally 
conclusive interpretations provided by for it by the authors. However, as has 
been noted for a few other articles, the underlying evidence for such an 
interpretation is never formalized in the text presentation.  
Dutta & 
Patatoukas 
Dutta and Patatoukas cite several null outcomes from placebo tests to validate 
their construct of conditional conservatism. Here we focus on two of these tests: 
(1) the test of the null hypothesis that the spread between the lagged accrual 
variances conditional on the sign of future unexpected returns is zero; (2) the 
test of the null hypothesis that the spread between the lagged cash flow variances 
conditional on the sign of future unexpected returns is zero. 
 
Empirical results are presented in their Table 6. The estimated spreads between 
the conditional variances of bad news and good news lagged accruals and lagged 
cash flows are -0.45% and -0.05%, respectively. They suggest that the 
conditional variance of bad news lagged accruals is 7.27% lower than that of 
good news one, and the conditional variance of bad news lagged cash flows is 
1.26% lower than that of good news one. Since the estimates lack significance 
at conventional levels, the authors conclude that they “find no evidence of 
asymmetry in the conditional variances of lagged earnings components”. We 
generate two standard deviation confidence intervals for these spreads by first 
dividing the reported effect by its associated t-value, as standard error estimates 
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are not directly reported. This yields standard error estimates of 0.009375 and 
0.002381, respectively. Then, we obtain two standard deviation confidence 
intervals of the spreads: LB = -2.33% and UB = 1.43% for lagged accruals and 
LB = -0.53% and UB = 0.43% for lagged cash flows. Converting them into 
percentages of overall conditional variances of good news variables gives us 
“LB” = -37.64% and “UB” = 23.10% for lagged accruals and “LB” = -13.35% 
and “UB” = 10.83% for lagged cash flows. That is, the presented evidence does 
not rule out the possibility that rather sizable differences exist in accrual and 
cash flow variances conditional on whether future return is positive or negative.  
Erickson et 
al.  
Erickson et al. does not provide any descriptive statistics for the null outcome 
besides observing that the p value >.50. 
Farrell et al. Farrell et al. examines honesty rates for students relative to online subjects 
(wokers) under comparable high pay conditions under two trust contracts and 
obtains null outcomes under both conditions. They conclude that “online 
workers’ honesty in reporting does not differ from that of student paricipants”. 
Group differences (student honesty rate less online honesty rate) are +8.6 
percentage points for the “trust contract” and -6.5 percentage points for the 
modified trust contract. Based on the reported t-values of 1.46 and 0.96 for 
these two differences the estimated standard errors here are 5.89 and 6.77 
percentage points. Hence, the relevant two standard deviation confidence 
intervals are LB = -3.18, UB =+20.38 for the “trust contract”, and LB = -
20.04, UB = +7.04 in the “modified trust contract.”  The LB estimates are of 
central interest here as the underlying hypothesis concerns the possibility that 
online participants are more dishonest. Hence, these values suggest that online 
participants are, at most, only slightly more dishonest than student participants 
in the “trust contract” setting. In the “modified trust contract” setting, 
however, it is hard to fathom how the possibility that the online worker 
honesty rate is as much as 20 percentage points lower than that of the student 
workers is compatible with an inference that no substantive difference in 
honesty rates is present under this sort of contract.   
More generally, as this paper contains multiple null outcomes, it is pertinent to 
note that the 20 to 30 percentage point confidence intervals documented here 
are representative of the sort of confidence intervals found throughout the 
article. Hence, in general, the analysis is not producing the sort of high 
precision estimates needed to substantiate propositions that underlying effects 
are reliably near zero, small or even, for that matter, something other than 
possibly very large.  
Francis et al.  No descriptive information provided.  
Frederickson 
& Zolotoy 
Discussed in main body of article.  
Gong et al.  In table 4 a null outcome occurs in the test of whether client accrual quality 
changed in the post-audit firm merger period. The estimated coefficient 
magnitude is -0.004, which the paper takes as indicating that “client firms’ 
accrual quality is not affected by firm mergers.” Based on the reported t-value 
of -0.947 the implied value of the standard deviation here is .0042. Hence, the 
two standard deviation CI is: LB = -0.0124, UB = +0.0044. The accrual 
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measure, AbsDA, has a standard deviation of 0.084. Using this to rescale the 
CI in terms of standard deviations of AbsDA gives:  LB = -.14.8% and UB = 
+5%. Absent further qualitative insights these values appear to be consistent 
with the inference that any sort of accruals quality effect that is present, 
particularly downside effect, is reliably small.  
Guenther et 
al.  
Guenther et al. (2017) examine the prediction that tax avoidance policies that 
reduce ETRs (Effective Tax Rates) are associated with a greater degree of tax 
rate volatility. Table 4 presents their main results and we focus on the null 
outcomes for the 5-year GAAP ETR and 3-Year Adjusted GAAP ETR 
measures, which are two of the four measures Guenther et al. identify as 
central to their analysis. The estimated coefficient effects for these two 
measures are 0.014 and 0.053 respectively. As the associated standard 
deviations for 5-Year GAAP ETR and 3-Year Adjusted GAAP ETR are 0.105 
and 0.101, these coefficients imply that a one standard deviation shift in 5-
Year GAAP ETR is expected to produce a corresponding future volatility shift 
of .0015 while a one standard deviation shift in 3-Year Adjusted GAAP ETR 
is expected to produce a corresponding future volatility shift of .0054. As the 
mean and standard deviation for future volatility are 0.134 and 0.203, these 
shifts correspond to 1.1% and 4.0% of mean volatility or, .7% and 2.7% of a 
standard deviation in volatility. In general, these sorts of magnitudes strike us 
as negligible.  
 
This negligibility assessment, however, is specific to the estimated effect 
magnitudes and does not take into account the level of precision associated 
with these magnitudes. Doing so requires confidence intervals. Based on the 
tabulated t-values, the standard errors associated with 5-Year GAAP ETR and 
3-Year Adjusted GAAP ETR are 0.034 and 0.038 respectively. Hence, the 
associated two standard deviation confidence intervals for the coefficient 
estimates are: 
 
(1) 5-Year GAAP ETR:           LB=-0.054; UB=0.082 
(2) 3-Year Adjusted GAAP ETR:   LB=-0.023; UB=0.129 
 
The table below translates these bounds into implications of a one standard 
deviation increase in a given ETR measure for future volatility measured as a 
percentage of: (1) the mean of future volatility; and, (2) the standard deviation 
of future volatility.  
 
 % of Mean Future Volatility % of S.D. of Future 
Volatility 
LB UB LB UB 
5-year ETR -4.3% +6.5% -2.8% +9.5% 
3-year ETR -1.7% +4.3% -1.1% +6.2% 
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The tabulated LB values here strike us as being quite small. The UB values, 
which are more salient to the issues framed by the paper, are larger, but still 
strike us as at least being arguably small.  
Hall  Hall examines the effect of labor cost cuts on future performance and  
concludes that there is “no evidence that using labor cost reductions to meet 
financial reporting and regulatory benchmarks improves future financial 
performance.” (P1691) The author uses ROA for each of subsequent years 
(ROAit+1, ROAit+2 and ROAit+3) as the dependent variables to measure the 
future financial performance in Table 7. This inference is based on tests of 
coefficient estimates for the independent variables SMINCR*LOWLC and 
LOWCAP*LOWLC. SMINCR is equal to 1 if the bank reports a small 
increase. LOWCAP is equal to 1 if the bank’s Tier 1 Capital Ratio is in the 
lowest quartile of the distribution of all banks in the sample. LOWLC is equal 
to 1 if the bank has abnormally low labor costs in year t. 
 
(1) The estimated coefficients on SMINCR*LOWLC are, in terms of basis 
points (bps), -0.8, 5.5, 11.4 for Public Banks and -0.8, -2.4, -3.7 for Private 
Banks.   (ROAit+1, ROAit+2 and ROAit+3 are multiplied by 100 in the 
regression per Table7 ROPA defnintions), While these estimates seem rather 
small, it is important to note that baseline ROAs for banks is generally around 
100 basis points (it averages 122 basis points for the paper’s sample per table 
3). Hence, an 11.4 basis (the estimated effect for t+3 ROA for public banks) 
point value is actually rather substantial. Based on the associated t-statistic the 
estimated standard errors associated with these estimates are -3.6, 5.4, 10.8, 
2.7, 4.0 and 5.2. Hence, the two standard deviation confidence intervals are: 
LB= -8.1bp, -5.4bp, -10.1bp, -6.1bp, -10.4bp and -14.1bb; UB= 6.5bp, 16.4bp, 
32.9bp, 4.5bp, 5.6bp and 6.7bp. 
 
From the perspective of real activities manipulation, which seems to be the 
primary focus of this analysis, these bounds indicate that we cannot reliably 
rule out a future period ROA decline as large as 10.1 basis points for public 
banks (ROAt+3) or as large as 14.1 basis points for private banks (ROAt+3). 
imply that ROA will decrease 14.1% point. While for most types of firms a 
one period increase in ROA of 10 to 14 basis points would be reasonably 
viewed as small, lending support for the conclusion that any ROA impact here 
is negligible, bank ROAs are inherently quite low. Hence, we cannot reliably 
rule out the possibility that material adverse real activities manipulation 
consequences are in play here. (Note, if we look instead at the future 
improvement aspect then the bounds are quite a bit larger, meaning we almost 
certainly should not view this evidence as reliably indicating that there is not a 
material upside benefit present.). 
Humphreys 
et al.  
The text discussion of the H2b results seems to employ values at odds with the 
reported statistics in Table 1. Hence, we are not sure what set of numbers we 
should use to conduct a confidence interval analysis. Detailed statistics are not 
provided for the second null outcome. 
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Kelly et al.  Kelly et al assess whether sales performance differs conditional on whether 
cash or tangible awards are provided. In the opening baseline tournament they 
conclude that “there is no overall difference in sales” between the two reward 
types. The evidence for this conclusion is reported in table 3. Here we employ 
the robust regression estimates reported in panel B as their interpretation is not 
confounded by the presence of an interaction term. The estimated effect of 
Tangible Reward in panel B is +$48.52. The implied standard error for this 
estimate, however, is $110. Hence, a two standard error confidence interval 
here yields an upper bound value of $268.52. As mean prior year sales levels 
are $866, this upper bound translates into a 31.17% differential change in 
sales. Hence, the analysis cannot rule out the possibility that the form of 
reward improved sales levels by as much as 31%. This seems to be far too 
large a value to justify a claim of there clearly being no significant difference 
in sales effect between the two reward types.     
Kim and 
Klein  
Discussed in main body of article 
Krishnan et 
al.  
 Krishnan et al. compare the inspection effects for auditors with and without 
deficiency reports and find no systematic differences for accruals or for value 
relevance. 
(1) For accruals, in Table 6, the estimated coefficients on POSTINSPEC*DEF 
are 0.012 for two-year window and 0.011 for four-year window. 
POSTINSPEC is indicator variable which equal to 1 for fiscal periods 
following the inspection. DEF is indicator variable which equal to 1 for 
observations of cross-listed clients of inspected auditors with deficiencies. We 
can use the p-values to back into the two-tailed t-values. Based on the 
associated t-statistic the estimated standard errors associated are 0.21 for two-
year window and 0.014 for four-year window. Hence, the relevant two 
standard deviation confidence intervals are LB = -0.031, UB = +0.055 for two-
year window and LB = -0.018, UB = +0.040 for four-year window. We can 
use the estimated value of the POSTINSPEC effect of -0.044 and -0.025 as 
relevant basis for judging magnitude here. After dividing the upper bound by 
the absolute value of these coefficients, we get upper bounds on the percentage 
of the effect that is being offset of 124.33% and 158.78 %. 
 
Furthermore, because the plausible upper bounds on the percentage of the 
effect that is being offset are greater than 100%, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the post-inspection effect is eliminated, reversed even, for 
firms with deficiencies. Hence, there is simply no reliable evidence here that 
the underlying effect is not large.  
 
2) For value relevance, only effects are reported. Hence, it is impossible to 
construct confidence intervals. 
 
Laurion et al. Laurion et al. report the null outcome for the presence of a relation between 
misstatement likelihoods after partner rotations. The estimated logit coefficient 
is 0.367 and based on the associated t-statistic the estimated standard deviation 
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associated with it is 0.314. Hence, the two standard deviation confidence 
interval is -0.261 to 0.943. Conversion of these bounds into likelihoods yields 
a range of -23% to +157%. Hence, based on the set of data examined in this 
analysis it is quite impossible to rule out the possibility that partner rotations 
resulted in very sizable increases in misstatement levels.   
Lennox  Discussed in main body of article. 
Li et al.  Li et al. (Jan. 2017) test the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
audit quality of non-failed auditors in the same office as a failed auditor and 
that of auditors in offices as a non-failed auditor. Specifically, they regress 
indicator variable ABS(AB_ACC) and AB_ACC>0 on FAIL_X_ 
COLLEAGUE. Table 6 reports estimated effects of 0.001 for FAIL_0_ 
COLLEAGUE and FAIL_10_COLLEAGUE for four models’ estimations. 
The non-reporting of further digits in these three estimations means we cannot 
reliably estimate the unreported associated standard errors as the underlying 
value possibly ranges from 0.00149 (50% higher than .001) to 0.0005 (50% 
lower than 0.001). In the fourth cases the estimated effect is 0.002, which 
narrows the range of possible values (as a percentage of 0.002) considerably. 
The associated t-value of 1.36 then implies an underlying standard error of 
around 0.0015, which in turn yields a two standard error confidence interval of 
-0.001 to +0.005. However, the audit quality dependent variable in this 
instance is the subsample of firm-years with positive abnormal accruals, but 
the article does not report descriptive statistics for this subsample. Hence, we 
were unable to devise a strategy for evaluating the magnitudes of these 
bounds.  
Lin & Wang Lin and Wang obtain two null outcomes, both of which concern a measure of 
innovation efficiency. Unfortunately, while descriptive statistics are provided 
for most of the variables they utilize, no such statistics are provided of the 
innovation measure. Consequently, we can provide a pertinent descriptive 
analysis for only one of them—the absence of a significant relation between 
the interaction of efficiency with takeover probability and equity returns. The 
analysis is based on the reported standard deviation of the Takeover Probalility 
variable of 0.16 (per p. 965 of article) and the table 4 reported coefficient 
estimates of 0.0126 and 0.146 for innovation efficiency and its interaction with 
Takeover Probability. Multiplying the interaction coefficient by the standard 
deviation of Takeover Probability indicates how much a one standard 
deviation difference in takeover probability shifts the overall relation between 
innovation efficiency and returns. This product is 0.023. Consequently, a one 
standard deviation shift in Takeover Probability shifts the overall relation 
between innovation efficiency and returns by 0.023, which is nearly double the 
magnitude of the general relation between innovation efficiency and returns. 
That is, the presented evidence here clearly cannot reliably rule out the 
possibility that the relation between innovation efficiency and equity returns is 
highly sensitive to Takeover Probability level.  
Lourenco  Discussed in main body of article. 
Nelson et al.  Nelson et al. report a null outcome for the test of whether alignment between 
issue and supervisor concerns has less of an effect on an auditor’s willingness 
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to speak up about an issue when the auditor’s supervisor is more team-
oriented. They conduct ANOVA test for the intersect TOL * Concern * Issue. 
In Table 3 Panel B, the corresponding p-value is 0.29. They conclude that they 
do not find support for the three-way interaction between audit issue, 
supervisor concern, and team-oriented leadership.  
While the authors do not report the estimated conditional mean for the 
TOL*Concern*Issue, we can infer it from other effect estimates that are 
reported in the table 3 (panel A). Specifically, the effect of alignment between 
issue and supervisor concerns in Team-Oriented Leadership group is 82.70+ 
79.26-64.30-69.00 =28.66, and the effect of alignment between issue and 
supervisor concerns in Non-Team-Oriented Leadership group is 60.96+65.88-
49.18-45.05=32.61. Hence, non-team oriented leadership is estimated to have 
a 3.95 point (speaking up is measured on a 1 to 100 point scale) increases in 
speaking up comfort level under these conditions. As the average level of 
speaking up comfort across the two groups here is 64.5 ((73.8+55.2)/2) this 
amounts to a 6% increase which is certainly not that large, but is certainly not 
essentially 0. Moving to the confidence interval determination, we infer a 
standard error estimate based on the reported p-value for the F-test of 0.29. 
This p-value corresponds to a t-value of around 1.05, suggesting that the 
standard error is around 3.76 (3.95/1.05). Hence, the two standard error 
confidence interval here ranges from -3.57 to +11.47. Or, in terms of percent 
of mean confidence level, from -5.5% to +17.8%. Hence, the analysis is unable 
to rule out the possibility that non-team oriented leadership increases speaking 
up comfort levels by as much as 17.8% relative to average.  
Nessa Column (5) of table 5 in Nessa reports a null outcome for the unconditional 
relation between repatriation costs and the level of repatriation exhibited by 
firms. The estimated effect is -0.0317 and the implied standard error is 0.0793. 
Hence, a two standard error confidence interval is from -0.1903 to +0.1269. 
The mean value of repatriation costs is 0.0023. Multiplying these bounds by 
this mean provides insights about the implications of this confidence interval 
for an “average repatriation cost firm.” Specifically, the estimated repatriation 
level effect for such an average firm ranges between -0.00044 to + 0.00029. 
The average (unconditional) repatriation level here is 0.0175. Consequently, 
when expressed as a percent of this level these bounds become -2.5% to 
+1.7%. These values seem broadly consistent with assertions that the impact of 
repatriation costs on repatriation levels is small.  
Patatoukas 
& Thomas  
Table 4 of Patatoukas and Thomas reports null outcomes for the relations 
between expected return and three different expected earnings constructs. All 
three estimates are negative, and the focal concern in the paper is that they are 
possibly positive. Hence, the negative estimates are consistent with the general 
inference that the relation is not positive. The estimated two standard error 
upper bounds for the three measures, however, are +.008, +.018, and +.012 
respectively. Dividing these by the estimated value (.251) of the asymmetric 
timeliness coefficient (which is what is being decomposed here) provides 
percentage of total effect upper bounds of 3.2%, 7.17%, and 4.78%. These 
magnitudes seem reasonably consistent with the idea, at least from a positive 
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side perspective, that the effect is fairly negligible or, in the words of the 
article, “close to zero.”  This assessment does, however, depend on the sorts of 
magnitudes we might expect to see here. It is also important to recognize here 
that this effect is being advanced as a mechanism for explaining an anomalous 
“Placebo” effect, which in this analysis is estimated at 0.159. When the above 
three upper bounds are scaled by this magnitude we get values 5.0%, 11.3%, 
and 7.5%. Hence, this effect can only reliably explain a small fraction of the 
anomalous effect that is in question here. (We thank Jake Thomas and Panos 
Patatoukas for suggesting this Placebo effect scaling perspective.) 
Robinson et 
al.  
Discussed in main body of article.  
Schroeder & 
Shepardson 
Table 6 of Schroeder and Shepardson report null outcomes for tests of whether 
the management assessment requirement affected accrual quality. Here we 
evaluate the metric based on the unexplained residual variation in accruals 
(UAQ_NOISE) as this measure can be reasonably scaled by the sample mean, 
which provides a reasonable basis for understanding underlying effect 
magnitudes. The estimated effect of imposing the assessment requirement 
equals -0.0014 in column (2). As negative values are consistent with reduced 
levels of unexplained variation, this estimate is directionally consistent with 
the conjecture that the assessment requirement improved accrual quality. 
Dividing by the average value of UAQ_NOISE for non-accelerated filers in 
the 2007 to 2011 time period of 0.042 (reported in table 2 of their analysis) 
converts this value into a percentage: 3.33%. Hence, the estimated effect 
suggests that a best guess estimate of the assessment requirement reduced 
unexplained variation in accruals by 3.33%. While this is certainly not a huge 
change, it is hard to say absent further descriptive perspective that it is 
negligible. The imputed standard error (in this case t-values are imputed from 
reported p-values for purposes of imputing the unreported standard error) here 
is .002, meaning that the two standard error lower bound of the estimated 
value is actually -0.0054, or 12.86%. Hence, based on the reported evidence in 
this study, one cannot rule out the possibility that the assessment requirement 
resulted in a reduction in unexplained accruals of well over 10%. This 
possibility does not quite square with the article’s conclusion that “our results 
suggest that SOX 404(a) management assessments do not yield significant 
improvement in internal control system quality.” 
Towery  Towery reports a null outcome for tests of whether firms subject to Schedule 
UTP do not experience a decrease in FedCashETR and CashETR. The 
coefficients on SchUTPInd reported in table are -0.0092 for FedCashETR and 
-0.0168 for cashETR. The associated standard errors, estimated from the 
reported t-statistics, are 0.012 and 0.017. Hence, the respective confidence 
intervals are: -0.0332 to +0.0148 and -0.0505 to +0.0168. The underlying 
standard deviations for these two changes in tax rate variables are 0.0973 and 
0.2251 implying standard deviation scaled bounds of -0.341 to +0.152 and -
0.224 to +0.075 which are not overly large but not small, particularly on the 
downside, either. However, the fact that these are change variables undercuts 
the usefulness of this scale. The mean or the standard deviation of the levels of 
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In six cases (bolded authors) the estimated bounds are consistent with the effect being, in our 
judgement, plausibly thought of as “small.” In five cases (italicized authors) the information 
reported in the article was insufficient for the determination of meaningful confidence intervals.  
 
these variables would be far more meaningful scales. Neither of these is 
reported in detail, but Figures 1 and 2 do provide information about their 
levels. In particular, FedCashETR seems to average around 0.06 while 
CashETR seems to average around 0.12. Unfortunately, the decimal level 
scaling used in these figures does not seem to be the same as that used for the 
changes, since the adjusted bound values based on them are insensibly large.     
Wieczynska Panel C of Wieczynska reports a null outcome for whether there is a change in 
the likelihood that firms in weak enforcement regimes switch auditors in the 
IFRS adoption year (for their country). The estimated coefficient in the binary 
change model is 0.03, with a standard error of 0.15. Hence, the two standard 
error confidence interval here is. -0.27 to +0.33. Converting these values into 
likelihoods we get a confidence interval of -23.7% to 39.1%. That is, based on 
its evidence, this study is unable to rule out the possibility that the likelihood 
that firms changed their auditor upon their country’s adoption of IFRS 
increased by as much as 39%. While this evidence could likely support a 
conclusion that auditor changes did not dramatically increase, they do not 
seem to justify a “rejection” of the proposition that they did not increase at all.    
